


THE CIRCASSIANS IN JORDAN

Bruce Douglas Mackey

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

THE CIRCASSIANS IN JORDAN

by

Bruce Douglas Mackey

June 1979

Thesis Advisor:

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The hypothesis of this study is that the Circassian minority in Jordan occupy this high political, economic and social position as a result of their loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy. This loyalty to an existing regime is a unique cultural characteristic of the Circassians which has developed as a result of their history. In the past it was chiefly expressed in military terms but in the past thirty years the Circassians have also supported the Hasemite monarchy economically and politically.

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The Circassians in Jordan

by

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Captain, United States Army

B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1970

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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June 1979

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the political, economic and cultural position of the Circassian minority in Jordan. Although the Circassian minority constitutes only about 1% of the population it occupies a disproportionately influential political and economic position. This thesis provides a brief historical background of the Circassians prior to their migration to Transjordan, outlines the means by which the Circassians reached their high status in Jordanian society, the methods by which they have maintained this position, and offers a projection as to the future of the Circassians in Jordan.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The hypothesis of this thesis is that the Circassian minority in Jordan occupy a political, economic and social status which is disproportionate to the relatively small sector of the populace which they constitute. This study will delineate and evaluate the current political, economic and social position of the Circassian minority in The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. To accomplish this purpose a twofold methodology will be utilized. The bulk of this study will examine the Circassians in a historical perspective, both prior to their arrival to Transjordan and after their migration from the Caucasus. The conclusion of this study will analyze the present political, economic and social position of the Circassian minority utilizing a behavioral approach.

The present position of the Circassian minority within Jordan is an outcome of an unusual and complex historical process. The specific details as to the migration of the Circassians to the Transjordan region and their settlement therein in a topic largely ignored by most works which deal with the area. This is mentioned by George H. Weightman in his article "The Circassians":

"Of all the ethnic minorities in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan none occupies a higher position of social importance nor wields such tremendous political and economic power than does a related group of peoples known in English as the Circassians and in Arabic as the Sharakisah. Nevertheless, most

studies on modern Jordan either entirely ignore the Circassians or relegate them to a mere mention as a quaint historic curiosity. There is nothing in the past of the Circassians nor in their present role of a dominant economic minority which warrants such supercilious scholarly treatment.¹"

The importance of an historical perspective in the evaluation of the current political status of the Circassians is in direct proportion to the continuing role which that history plays in molding their present political attitudes and expectations. While Jordan is, by almost any measure, a modernizing country, tradition and history continue to greatly influence its politics. Jordan has been spared the violent revolutions which have occurred in neighboring Arab countries and thus has preserved, to a greater extent than its neighbors, a political and social continuity. As will be shown later this political and social continuity has in the past favored the Circassians and continues to do so to the present time. It is for this reason that a historical perspective on the migration of the Circassians to Trans-jordan and their political, social, and economic history in the area is crucial to an understanding of their present position.

The second approach which will be utilized was originally outlined in, The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba.²

¹Weightman, G. H., "The Circassians," Middle East Forum, December 1961, p. 26.

²Almond, G. A. and Verba, S., The Civic Culture, Little Brown and Co., 1963.

This approach is excellently analyzed in regards to its specific application to Middle Eastern politics in the article, "Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics" by Gabriel Ben-Dor.³ This article points out both the strengths and weaknesses of the civic culture approach to Middle Eastern politics and outlines the bulk of the works which have attempted to use this approach, in one form or another, to analyze the political system in a specific country or social strata within a country. This article asks several questions and develops several conclusions which bear directly upon both the content and methodology of this thesis.

First among the points raised in Ben-Dor's article is the need for research which goes beyond the country or elite centered studies to probe the attitudes of specific groups within the population. As the article states, '

"More systematic differentiation between the various elites is clearly necessary, but in order to make real progress, it is necessary to go now beyond elite studies, and research the political attitude or various other groups in the population."⁴

Dr. Ben-Dor is very quick to point out as his next major point, the difficulty of conducting research along these lines without direct access to the subject population base.

³Ben-Dor, G., "Political Cultural Approach to Middle East Politics," International Journal of Middle East Studies, January 1977, p. 8.

⁴Ibid.

He adds however that this difficulty is not one which is likely to fade with the passing of time.

"One major obstacle to the shift from elite studies to studies oriented toward the population as a whole is of course the difficulty of conducting survey research in the Middle East, both because of political factors and cultural differences that seriously bring into question the value of some survey research done in the past in the region. This obstacle can be overcome in a variety of ways. First of all, there is the possibility of reviewing the available scarce data with a different set of questions in mind."⁵

This approach to the question of the political culture of the Circassian community in Jordan is, under the present circumstances, the only viable method. Data, historical or political on the Circassian community is scarce and on-site survey material virtually non-existent. This thesis will attempt to compensate for that problem by combining available data with numerous interviews conducted in this country. While this method falls far short of the rigorous survey requirements usually demanded by the "civic culture" approach, it has disclosed several major facets or trends within the Jordanian-Circassian community. Addressing this point Dr. Ben-Dor writes,

"There is no need, however, to accept the 'fact of life' that seems to be at the heart of the Almond-Verba effort, namely that survey research must occupy an almost exclusive place as the tool of analysis in the study of political culture. Indeed, Middle Eastern specialists could make a significant methodological contribution if they were able to utilize the limitations of survey research in order to develop alternative methods that are more realistic in terms of the Middle East today."⁶

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

The third point which Dr. Ben-Dir makes in his article, applicable to this thesis, is the necessity of exploring the relationship between a group's political standing and various other social factors inherent within the group. As Dr. Ben-Dor states,

"Apart from the neglect of subcultural differentiation and the lack of adequately dynamic orientation to continuity and change, the relationship between politics and other spheres of life was not sufficiently explored. A number of scholars have observed that in the Middle East power leads to wealth, and not vice versa.⁷ Does this mean that the conception of the relationship between politics and economics in the Middle East is a common, distinguishing feature of the region? How does this compare with other areas of the world? Does this mean that politics is more or less salient there than elsewhere? What is the relationship between this fact and the tradition of Islam as a total, embracing social system? Does this cultural trait help explain specific problems of political structure in the region?"⁸

Each of these questions asked by Dr. Ben-Dor apply to some extent to the topic of this thesis. The Circassians were an Islamic group plunged into the Middle Eastern culture. Admittedly the Circassians went from one relatively isolated area to another, but the differences in the two areas cannot be overstated. These differences will be explored in relating the migration of the Circassian people from the Caucasus to Transjordan.

⁷Here Dr. Ben-Dir cites, "E.g., Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, 1963), p. 46, and Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Essays (London, 1970), Chapter 12.

⁸Ben-Dor, p. 59.

The "civic culture" approach is difficult to apply even under the best of survey and research circumstances. When confronted with the lack of data available on the Circassians the problem is compounded. However it is necessary that this subject be explored beyond a simple historical recreation of the facts available. The political, social, economic and religious motives of the Circassians must be analyzed to lend a complete understanding of the place they occupy in Jordan today. The "civic culture" approach lends the best available framework for this analysis under the prevailing circumstances.

This thesis is organized into three major sections. The first section deals with the history of the Circassians prior to the formation of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1923. This section provides the necessary groundwork for an understanding of the initial political, social and economic position of the Circassians in the newly established Emirate.

The second section of this thesis deals with the evolution of the position of the Circassians from the founding of the Emirate to the present time. This section comprises the bulk of the thesis and draws heavily from the many and often contradictory works on this period. In these works the Circassians are portrayed in various lights,

usually dependent upon the political leanings of the author.⁹ This thesis will attempt to present these various views as to the political and economic role of the Circassians during this period and advance several independent theories. Two major problems were encountered in the research of this section. The first was the amount of misinformation which is included in the scattered references on the Circassians. As an example, Raphael Patai, in his book The Kingdom of Jordan states that the Chechen, a related minority of the Circassians, are Shiite Muslims.¹⁰ Both personal interviews and other sources¹¹ assert that the Chechens are now, and have been from their migration to Jordan, Sunni.

The second problem encountered was the understandable reluctance of both the Circassian minority and Jordanian government to stress or even acknowledge any degree of separateness between the Arab and Circassian populace. Even the estimates as to the population of Circassians in Jordan is very much in question as past censuses included no separate category for Circassians. Considering the atmosphere

⁹This difference is nowhere more evident than in a comparison of the works of Sir John Glubb and Nasur Aruri, (Jordan: A Study in Political Development, 1921-1965).

This comparison gives the reader the impression that he's reading about two distinct minorities. Only the common title Circassians links the two.

¹⁰Patai, R. ed., The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Human Relations Area Files Inc., p. 21, 1956.

¹¹Weightman, p. 27.

of Arab unity and solidarity which has swept through the Middle East it would be only natural for a non-Arab minority to resist efforts to single it out, even for the purpose of a census.

The third section of this thesis will analyze the present position of the Circassians utilizing the "civic culture" framework and make some projections as to the future of the Circassians in Jordan.

II. THE ORIGIN OF THE CIRCASSIANS

The original homeland of the Circassians now living in Jordan is the north-western portion of the Caucasus mountains. A map showing this region with the major towns and cities and tribal areas is found on the following page. The bulk of archeological evidence points to almost continuous inhabitation of this area since the Palaeolithic Age. The most probable ancestor of the modern Circassian race was a group which resulted from the union of several major tribes in the area and is known as the Sindo-Meotian tribal union.

"The analysis of the archeological finds in Circassia of the third through the first Millenium B.C. testify to the cultural unity of the Sindo-Meotian tribes (Kerkets, Torets and so on), who inhabited here, and, who, it has already been proven, have been the ancestors of the Circassians in general and the creators of the legendary Nart Epos.


The Sindo-Meotian tribal union (as it was called by Greek authors) which was formed out of such tribes as Kerkets, Torets and others, began to experience, in the first millenium B.C., a definite influence from the Scythian, Greek and, later on, from the Sauromato-Allan ethnic groups who came to the Caucasus."¹²

The Caucasus area figured prominently in Greek mythology.

"Greek mythology claims that Jupiter gave the name to this land to commemorate the day Saturn slew the shepherd, Caucasus, here."¹³

¹²Varoque, Khaireddin, "Archaeology in Circassia," The Circassian Star, v. 1, p. 28, January-June 1978.

¹³Ibid.



"To the ancient Greeks, Caucasia, and the mighty range which dominates it, were a region of mystery and romance. It was here that they placed the scene of the sufferings of Prometheus (vide Aeschylus, Prometheus Vinctus), and there, in the land of Calchis, which corresponds to the valley of Rion, that they sent the Argonauts to fetch the golden fleece."¹⁴

For the purposes of this thesis only selected events in Circassian history are pertinent, and a detailed re-counting of the history would serve no purpose. Two major points must be made concerning the characteristics of the history of the region.

"Perhaps the most important characteristics of Circassian history is the intertwining of the history of two distinct groups. In the first group we have the great powers concentrated sometimes in the Caucasian area, but in the majority of cases having their headquarters far away from the Caucasus. To this group belong the Byzantine Empire, the Sassanian Empire, the Kazar Empire, the Arab Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia. The second group consists of the so-called small powers whose main concentration has always been in the area. This group includes the Georgians, the Armenians, the Circassians, the Mountain Tribes, and the Azeri-Turks (a small power only during the last centuries). The small powers in general have lived under the domination of the great powers, and with remarkable regularity, whenever the dominating great powers become weak or were seriously fighting with others they entered into their independent periods, formed states with the attribute 'Great', or lived in a 'Golden Age.'

The second importance characteristic of Caucasian history is that the South Caucasus and the North Caucasus did not in general form a unit. In the case of the small powers this is obvious. In the case of the great powers, however, it must be explained by the fact that the mountain chain of the Caucasus constituted a formidable dividing line. It is very significant that the North and South Caucasus have formed a single unit only three times. The first case or rather attempt, was the Mongolian, in which both areas were subjugated by the Mongolians coming from the East. The second case was the Ottoman one, when the North and South Caucasus were both occupied by them from the West.

¹⁴Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 549.

In other words, in both cases the expansion paralleled the Caucasian chain, which circumstances somewhat facilitated. Yet only once, in the Russian case, did a great power succeed in dominating the whole area by a direct crossing of the chain of the Caucasus. This crossing was without doubt aided by a technology unknown to the previous periods."¹⁵

Both of these general characteristics of Caucasian history apply strongly in the case of the Circassians. Of all of the various tribes or tribal groups which inhabited the Caucasus, the Circassians were, until their eventual conquest by the Russians, the most independent from other Caucasus groups and the most willing to enter into pacts with larger empires without relinquishing their own independence. Additionally the Circassians retained their strongholds in the central mountain regions of the North Caucasus and therefore were able to retain a greater degree of autonomy than the peoples of the coastal plains and steeps.

The first known empire to reign over the Northern Caucasus was the Kimmerian empire which was probably Thracian¹⁶ in origin and existed from approximately the 13th century B.C. until approximately 750 B.C. when it was succeeded by the Scythian Empire. Shortly after the establishment of the Scythian Empire, Greek settlements began appearing along the Black Sea coast and it is through the works of the Greek historian Herodotus that a great deal is known about the Scythian Empire. These colonies became

¹⁵Halasi-Kun, T. "Historical Setting," The Caucasus, p. 266, Human Relations Area Files Inc., 1956.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 268.

major trading centers and remained Greek in nature until the end of World War II.

The Sarmatian Empire replaced the Scythian Empire at approximately 250 B.C. and remained in power until 250 A.D.¹⁷ when it was replaced by the Alan Empire. It should be noted at this point that the preceeding three "empires" simply indicated the domination of one ethnic nomad people over another. The only recorded empire in the classically historical sense in the area during this period was the State of Bosphorus founded in 438 B.C. by the Spartocides, a Hellenized Thracian dynasty.¹⁸ This small state centered around the Sea of Azov, had little if any interplay with the Circassians. This empire was conquered by Methridates II, King of Pontus in 110 B.C.¹⁹ Bosphorus is noteworthy for the purposes of this thesis in that their records are the first to mention the existence of mountain tribes to the east which were, in all probability the forerunners of the Circassians.

The end of the fourth century saw the Alans pushed southward by the Huns. Following the death of Attila (453 A.D.) the Pontic Hun Empire was formed. This empire remained until approximately 550 A.D. when the Kök Turks

¹⁷Ibid., p. 272

¹⁸Ibid., p. 271.

¹⁹Ibid.

founded what has become known as the greatest Turkic state in history extended from the Kingan Mountains in Manchuria to the Crimea. The center of this vast empire was the area which is now known as Outer Mongolia. This empire appears to be much like the former 3 empires in this area, a loose confederation of tribes. The mountain tribes of the Northern Caucasus in all probability concluded agreements whereby they retained their independence in exchange for a pledge of non-aggression or tribute.

The political situation in the North Caucasus remained fairly stable until the early seventh century. At this time the activities of the Byzantine emperor Heraclius I (c. 575-641 A.D.) were to change the political complexion of the whole Caucasus. In Heraclius's campaigns against the Sassanians he made use of the Kazars, a Turkic people who had settled in the eastern Caucasus approximately a century earlier. The Kazars participation in this successful campaign gave them great power within their region, and allowed them to establish an empire with commercial-military outposts as far as Kiev and Norgorad in the west and northwest with their capital in Dagestan.²⁰ This empire became the bulwark against the Islamic expansion, a bulwark which was to remain until the first half of the 11th century. It is most probable that it was during the domination of the Kazar Empire over the Circassian mountain tribes that Christianity became the prevalent religion among

²⁰Ibid., p. 279.

the Circassians. This fact is attested to by most sources²¹ and the presence of numerous Christian relics in the area.²² This conversion was carried out via the Byzantine influence in the area, the Kazar and Byzantine empires being closely allied during this period.

A brief aside must be made here as to the introduction of Circassians as slaves in the Mideast. The Caucasus were frequently used as a source of slaves since the introduction of ports on the Black Sea to the outside world by the Greeks in the 8th century B.C. Among the slaves exported from the Caucasus were Circassians who were prized for their hardiness, loyalty and physical appearance. Later the slave trade from the Caucasus was monopolized by the Genoese.²³ Circassian slaves were imported in great numbers to Egypt to form the military units.

The Circassians were imported to Egypt to form a bodyguard for the Bahri Mamluk Qulawun (1279-90). They eventually rose to power under the Sultan Barkuk, who was a Circassian and is called the "Founder of Circassian rule" in Egypt. The Circassians ruled from 1382 to 1517 until their power was broken by the Ottomans. Even after their loss of titular power the Circassians continued to represent a

²¹Encyclopedia of Islam, "Cherkes," p. 22.

²²Longworth, J. A., A Year Among the Circassians, Henry Colburn, 1840, p. 64.

²³Halasi-Kun, p. 279.

powerful force in Egyptian politics until they were slaughtered by Muhammad Ali in 1811.

The rise and fall of the Circassian Mamluk rule has importance to the subject of this thesis in two major ways. First, it established for the Circassians a reputation in the Mideast for military efficiency, if not often ruthless ability. Thus by the time the Circassians migrated from the Caucasus to Jordan centuries later, the race was both known and respected. Secondly, it raises an important question, to be explored later, as to the relationship between the Circassians in Egypt who survived the massacre by Muhammad Ali in 1811 and the Circassian immigrants to Jordan.

To return to the situation in the northern Caucasus, the Kazar Empire remained dominant in the Northern Caucasus until the first half of the 11th century when the Empire collapsed and in its' place three rival groups appeared. The Oghuz Turks occupied the Don curve, the Alan tribal group occupied the northern steppe region and the Russian State of Kiev was founded on the Taman Peninsula.²⁴

The Mongol invasion changed the political complexion of the whole Caucasus region and brought about several changes which were to have a large impact on the future of the Circassian people.

²⁴Ibid., p. 287.

First, the Mongol invasion of the early 13th century marked the first time that the entire Caucasus had come under the domination of a single group. Thus it unified, even for a brief period, the North and South Caucasus which heretofore had usually been under radically different forms of domination. While the Mongol domination did little to impart a sense of unity to the peoples of the Caucasus, it did make both sections aware of one another, and more importantly, aware of the world on a larger scale. There is little evidence however that there was ever any concerted effort on the part of the peoples of the Caucasus to resist the invasion and when the Mongol Empire split in 1256 A.D.,²⁵ it did so on characteristic north-south lines.

Upon the breakup of the Mongol Empire two distinct empires came into existence, the Kipchak empire in the north and the Ilkhanid Empire in the south. These two empires were quite unfriendly and a no-mans land, the territory of the Circassians and mountain tribes, existed between them on an independent basis.²⁶ Along the coast of the Sea of Azov, Genoese colonies sprang up, dealing chiefly in shipping slaves to Egypt and Italy.²⁷

The political situation of the Caucasus was again changed beginning in 1391 A.D. by the invasion of Timur.

²⁵Ibid., p. 289.

²⁶Ibid., p. 290.

²⁷Ibid.

The whole of the south Caucasus fell to Timur and the territory of the Circassians and mountain tribes was used as a route for Timur's several attacks against the Kipchak Empire. Although Timur was never able to defeat the Kipchak Empire, the stress of defending itself weakened the Kipchak Empire to the point that , in 1405 A.D.,²⁸ it split into five different khanates. Of these only two existed in the North Caucasus: the Khanate of Crimea and the Khanate of Astrakhan. Both of these Khanates were ethnically Kipchak Turk. The Circassian and mountain tribes retained their independence.

The next three centuries, from 1475 A.D. to 1774 A.D. can be characterized as a period of Ottoman influence, but not domination, in the North Caucasus and especially in the Circassian territory. It is during this period that Sunni Islam totally replaced Christianity as the religion of the Circassians.

The year 1475 A.D. saw two important events take place in the Caucasus. The Genoese colony was completely liquidated by the Crimean Khanate and this khanate signed a treaty with the Ottoman Empire which reduced it to the status of an Ottoman vassal state.²⁹

The relationship between the Crimean Khanate and the Circassian peoples was one of mutual respect, with neither

²⁸Ibid., p. 292.

²⁹Ibid., p. 294.

group attempting to subvert or dominate the other. The Circassians were not numerous or powerful enough to attempt any domination of the Crimean Khanate, and were, in all probability, too involved in inter-tribal conflicts. The relationship of the Crimean Khans to the Circassians is probably best described in the following:

"Replacing the Genoese on the Black Sea coasts the Ottomans took Anapa (Anapa) and Koba (Copa), but the Circassian tribes in the hinterland continued to be dependent on the Crimean Khans who as under the Golden Horde sent their sons to be brought up among the Circassians. Along with the marriages of the Crimean princes with the Circassian noblewomen this secured the attachment of the Cerkes; they gave the Khans a yearly tribute consisting of slaves as well as auxiliary forces."³⁰

Between 1539 and 1549 the Crimean Khan Sahib Giray made a series of five expeditions against the Circassians in an attempt to subdue them and bring them under complete domination. However these expeditions proved to be largely unsuccessful and after his death several Circassian tribes sacked the Taman peninsula and threatened Azak.³¹ These tribes claimed the protection of Ivan IV, whose second wife as a Circassian princess.³²

Russia was a new and powerful force which entered the political scene in the Caucasus with the occupation of the Khanate of Kazan in 1552 and Khanate of Astrakhan in 1556 as well as their establishment of a naval base on the Caspian Sea at Tersk.³³ This threat of Russian

³⁰Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 25.

³¹Ibid., p. 21.

³²Ibid., p. 25.

³³Ibid., p. 21.

encroachment led the Ottoman state to increase its efforts to solidify its influence in the Caucasus. This affected the Circassian people in that, while the Ottomans acknowledged the Crimean sovereignty over the Circassians, they nonetheless sent orders and granted titles to Circassian tribal chieftains.³⁴ The Ottoman sultan Selim II wrote to the Czar in 1570 A.D. ordering him not to interfere with his subjects, the Circassians.³⁵

There are several opinions as to the major turning point in the history of the Caucasus which marked the beginning of the end of Ottoman influence in the area. The most balanced view is offered in The Cambridge History of Islam:

Until about 936/1530 the Ottoman empire did not see in the Grand Duchy of Muscovy a source of danger in the north. Before that date the Crimea and the shores of the Black Sea were threatened by the Jagellonian kings of Poland and until the end of the ninth/fifteenth century, by the khans of the Golden Horde. In order to oppose the alliance of these two forces the Ottomans supported the weak Crimean khanate and the Grand Duchy of Muscovy. In consequence, there was a show of friendship for the Russians in 897/1492, and they were allowed to trade freely in Ottoman dominions. When, however, a struggle started between Muscovy and the Crimea over the remnants of the Golden Horde, Astrakhan and Kazan, the Ottomans saw for the first time that the Muscovites were a source of danger to themselves. Sahib Giray who became khan of Kazan in 929/1523 and of the Crimea in 938/1532 tried to place Kazan under Ottoman protection and, with Ottoman help, to hold the Volga basin against the Muscovites. In 945/1538, as a result of Suleyman's campaign in Moldavia, the Ottomans detached southern Bessarabia from Moldavia and formed the separate sanjak of Akkerman. This completed the process of turning the Black Sea into an Ottoman lake.

³⁴Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 25.

³⁵Ibid.

However, on account of their preoccupations with central Europe, and also because they thought that a strengthened Crimean khanate might threaten the Ottoman position in the Black Sea, they did not support Sahib Giray. Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible), after assuming the title of tsar in 1547, proceeded to capture Kozan in 959/1552 and Astrakhan between 961/1554 and 963/1556 in spite of Crimean attempts to stop him. He penetrated as far south as the River Terek in the Caucasus, and found allies among the Circassians and the Nogay. In 967/1559 Russian Cossacks raided Azov and the coast of the Crimea for the first time. The prince (voyvoda) of Moldavia, Petru Rareș, sought the protection of Moscow against the Ottomans (950/1543). The pope began also to consider the tsar as a possible participant in projected crusades. It was at this time that strong complaints against the Muscovites started coming in from central Asia. In this way the future Russian threat was finally delineated in the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century, and came to the attention of the Ottomans.³⁶

From this time onward the history of the Caucasus is one of the struggle between the Russians and Ottomans, with the Russians normally victorious.

Following the fall of Azov in 1774 A.D.³⁷ the Russian occupation of the Crimean Khanate became inevitable. By 1783³⁸ the Ottomans had permanently lost the Crimean Khanate and the Black Sea Cossacks held dominion over the eastern shores of the Sea of Azov. In the eastern Caucasus the Russians had occupied Derbent, on the Caspian in 1722³⁹

³⁶Cambridge History of Islam, Cambridge Press, 1971, v. 1, p. 36, 334.

³⁷Halasi-Kun, p. 299.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Seton-Watson, H., The Russian Empire 1801-1917, Oxford, 1967, p. 60.

and Baku in 1723.⁴⁰ In the Central Caucasus the Russians first crossed the Caucasus in 1770,⁴¹ establishing the fortress stronghold of Vladikavkaz (Ruler of the Caucasus) and taking possession of Kutaisi. Thus by the end of the 18th century the Russians had penetrated the Caucasus in the east, west and central areas. And in doing so they had isolated the Circassians, as well as numerous other mountain tribes, in pockets deep within the Caucasus mountains.

Following the Adrianople Peace Treaty in 1829⁴² the coastal strip between Abkhazia and the Taman Peninsula was ceded to the Russians. This left the Circassians totally encircled.

The history of the struggle of the Circassians against the Russians is one which even today stirs powerful emotions on the part of native Circassians. The conquest of the Circassian lands by the Russians and the subsequent immigration of at least half of the Circassian peoples from those lands remains alive in the memory of most, if not all, present-day Circassians. In interviews conducted concerning almost any aspect of Circassian history of politics it is referred to with mixed pride and regret.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 60.

⁴¹Halasi-Kun, p. 300.

⁴²Ibid., p. 302.

The Russian campaigns against the Circassians can be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase, from 1837 to 1845 ended in a qualified defeat for the Russians. The second phase, from 1857 to 1864 ended in total Russian domination of the Circassian lands.

The first stage of the Russian conquest of the Circassian territories included the additional element of British involvement. The agent of British policy in the area was Lord Ponsonby, the English ambassador to the Porte.

On 20 January 1834 the Russian and Turkish governments concluded a convention in St. Petersburg which provided for the evacuation of the Romanian principalities by the Russian troops which remained there from the war of 1828-9. It also reduced substantially the sum of the indemnity which Turkey was still to pay to Russia. However the terms of the convention alarmed Ponsonby in Constantinople, chiefly because it allowed Russian troops to be kept in Silistria for another eight years and because it involved a small frontier reclarification in the Caucasus which brought Russia closer to Kars and to a caravan route between Persia and the Black Sea coast. Meanwhile, Palmerston had arranged with Ponsonby and with the British commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean that the British fleet could be summoned to the Sea of Marmora by the Ambassador if he thought it necessary in order to defend Turkey against an imminent Russian danger. This power was actually used in May 1834.

During the next years Ponsonby succeeded in counterbalancing Russian influence in Constantinople. The Sultan was freed from sole dependence on Russia, and was able to maneuver between Russia and Britain. It must be admitted, however, that Ponsonby's alarmist views of Russian aims were far in excess of the facts, and that Nicholas I at this time pursued a moderate policy. The same can hardly be said of Ponsonby, or of his friend the free-lance journalist and temporary diplomatic agent David Urquhart, who conducted a rather successful campaign in Britain on behalf of Turkey. His pamphlet "England, France, Russia and Turkey," published in 1834, denounced Russian aims. His weekly paper, Portfolio, which first appeared on 28 November 1835, argued the advantages of more extensive trade with Turkey. Another favorite theme of Urquhart's writings was the struggle of the Circassians against Russia. In the summer of 1834 he secretly landed near Anapa and met with a number of Circassian chiefs. He later

published in Portfolio a Circassian declaration of independence, which he had helped to draft. Early in 1836 he returned to Constantinople from London, and with the approval of Ponsonby persuaded a British shipping company, George Bell and Company, to send one of its schooners, Vixen, to trade on the Circassian coast at Sudjuk Kale. At this time the Russian government claimed that the Circassian coast was its territory, but the British government had not recognized the claim, while the Turkish government also claimed that the Sultan had some authority over the Circassians. Ponsonby and Urquhart reckoned that if the Russians seized the Vixen this would cause a major conflict between Britain and Russia, which they desired, whereas if they took no action this could be used as an argument to show that Russia did not control the Circassian coast. Vixen was detained and confiscated by the Russians. Palmerston, however, did not wish a conflict with Russia. On 19 April he stated that, though Britain did not accept that the whole coast was under Russian authority, she did admit the right of the Russian government to make quarantine and customs regulations in regard to the port of Sudjuk Kale. It followed from this that the Russians had the right to confiscate Vixen, and Palmerston made no claim for compensation to the vessel's owners.⁴³

The "Vixen Affair" as it was termed made a large, if somewhat brief, impression on the British reading public and newspaper correspondents such as Urquhart and Longworth continued to publish newspaper accounts and books on the subject of the struggle of the Circassians against the Russian invaders. These reporters were made more interesting through the cooperation of Lord Ponsonby in Constantinople who continued to support, if only by diplomatic means, the Circassian nationalist aims.

During the first phase of the Russian campaign against the Circassians, Lord Ponsonby sent, early in 1839 through

⁴³Seton-Watson, p. 304.

Mr. Urquhart, a letter which supported Circassian independence. The communication was sent to Sefer Bey, the Circassian ambassador in Constantinople. The incident is summarized as follows,

"They (the Circassians) were to send a flag of truce to the Russian general, demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities, and proposing terms of peace for the future. They were to engage on their part, to abstain from all violation of the Russian territory, and to respect from that time the international boundary of the Kuban; while the Russians, on their side, were to retire beyond the river, and evacuate the fortresses they had raised in Circassia. For the observance of these conditions, as regarded themselves, they were empowered to offer the guarantee of England. These propositions were to be made three times; and in the event of their being rejected by the general, the result was to be forthwith transmitted to the Ambassador at Constantinople."⁴⁴

Their proposal was rejected by the Russian general in charge of operations, General Willemeneff.⁴⁵

The Russians had decided upon a campaign of slow reduction of the Circassian territory through the construction of a series of forts which would steadily encroach on the Circassian lands and in time make the surrounding area of each fort a passive district. To that end the Russians began the construction of forts in 1837.⁴⁶

Beginning in early 1840 there was a large scale uprising by the Circassians. The Circassians had united in the wake of a Muslim religious movement known as Muridism. Muridism was a common sect in Islam and had been prevalent

⁴⁴Longworth, p. 135.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 135.

⁴⁶Seton-Watson, p. 292.

in the Caucasus for centuries. The word murid means a disciple in a mystical sect, in this case a sect in which the disciples are initiated in the true Path (tarikats) to wisdom by a holy man. What differed in the rise of Muridism in this case was the leadership of a young murshid (head of a sect) named Kazi Mulla. Mulla declared a holy war against the Russians in Daghestan in 1827 and received widespread support. In October 1832 General Velyaminov invaded Kazi Mulla's territory and managed to largely pacify the area and kill Mulla. Kazi Mulla was succeeded by Shamil, who has been accorded by all historians of that area and period as possessing a brilliant military ability, political know-how and religious conviction. The problem of the official government position on Shamil haunts the Soviet Union to this day with frequent revision as to his historical status.⁴⁷

Shamil was elected Imam in 1834 and immediately set about to reorganize the administration of his movement. He divided his territory which at that time consisted of most of Daghestan and Chechnya, into provinces and districts, each of which was administered by a naib who was both military commander and civic ruler. The naib was assisted by a kadi or judge who was responsible for the administration of religious law. The positions were mutually exclusive and each was forbidden to interfere with the other. In the case of any dispute the matter was referred

⁴⁷Henze, P. B., "Unrewriting History-The Shamil Problem," Caucasian Review, 1958, p. 7-29.

to the Divan or State Council or to the Imam himself. Shamil also instituted a system of secret inspections to check the activities of the naibs and kadis. With his administration functioning smoothly Shamil developed a system to utilize the natural resources of the area for the production or purchase of war material. He was successful in this matter also and had built a powerful military force by 1836, at which time he began a carefully planned and controlled campaign of raids against the Russians.

The military situation in the Caucasus was desperate for Shamil and the Circassians in 1836. The Russians controlled the major cities of Stavropol, Georgievsk, Vladikavkaz, Ekaterenogradskaya and Tiflis and had established a series of fortifications in the Caucasus from east to west. Shamil instituted a series of raids which were highly successful and threatened the Russian positions. These attacks coincided with raids in the western Caucasus which resulted in the capture of several Russian forts. The next year, 1837, the Tsar visited the Caucasus and requested a meeting with Shamil, which was refused.

In early 1838 General von Grabbe headed a campaign which laid seige to Shamil's stronghold at Ahalgo and captured it, however Shamil escaped and Russian casualties were 3,000. The Russians continued to attempt to pacify the territory but at heavy cost. The Russians lost 8,000 casualties from 1840-1842 and Shamil's movement steadily

became more popular. As a result of the heavy Russian casualties Prince Shernejskev, the Russian War Minister, was sent to the Caucasus to investigate. He ordered all military action against Shamil to cease until a successful strategy could be devised.

In 1843 Shamil went on the offensive and again threatened Russian positions throughout the Caucasus. Count Michael Vorontsov was appointed Viceroy of the Caucasus by Tsar Nicholas in 1844. Vorontsov advocated a policy of slow and steady encroachment on Shamil's territory, pacifying each area with a series of mutually supporting forts with secure lines of communication between them. The Tsar however pressured him for quick results and a disastrous campaign was launched in May 1845. A force of 18,000 men was sent into Chechnia to close with and destroy Shamil's forces. The mountain soldiers of Shamil retreated without contact and when Vorontsov retired his forces they struck at his rear. When Vorontsov eventually reached Grozny he had sustained losses of over 4,000 men.⁴⁸ In 1846 Shamil again went on the offensive and it appeared he would militarily unite the eastern and western Circassian tribes but this was prevented by General Frutag commanding the line along the Sundja river.

⁴⁸Seton-Watson, p. 293.

Having failed in his attempt to link the eastern and western Circassians, Shamil concentrated on broadening his political, economic and military base in the eastern Caucasus. The Russians launched no new campaigns and Shamil contented himself with sporadic raids upon Russian positions. The period of 1845 to 1857 was one of a qualified and undeclared truce in the area.

Following the Crimean War, Russia was able to once again go on the offensive against Shamil. In 1857 General Yevdokimov launched a campaign (one report states he had 280,000 troops at his command)⁴⁹ which adopted the strategy of slow and methodical encroachment and pacification of Shamil's territory. Shamil's forces were steadily pressed backwards and encircled. In April 1859 Shamil's stronghold at Bedno was stormed and Shamil escaped with his most faithful followers to the last stronghold on Mount Gunib. Village after village had either been pacified by the Russians or deserted Shamil's cause to seek Russian protection. On 25 August 1859 Mount Gunib was encircled and Shamil's position became impossible. He surrendered and was sent to St. Petersburg where he was received by the Tsar. A personality who had been romantically treated in Russian literature, Shamil was placed under light house arrest and in Kaluga and later Kiev and allowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he died in 1871.

⁴⁹Tatlok, T., "The Centennial of the Capture of Shamil: A Shamil Biography," Caucasian Review, 1959, p. 86.

With Shamil defeated the unity of the Circassians broke down, however various mountain tribes continued to resist the Russians. The period 1859 to 1863 is best described in the following passage:

In 1859, after two decades of exhaustive war in the mountains the Russians finally captured Sheyh Shamil, the leader of the Circassian Muslims who were trying to maintain the independence of their lands. Subsequently the Russians advanced southward along the coast of the Black Sea to Anapa and Sakumkale, both of which were administrative centers and strongholds of Circassian Muslims. Then the Russian army turned inland to face the Circassian tribes which had fought against it under Sheyh Shamil. The Russians demanded that the Circassians settle north, in the marshes of Kuban, and serve in the Russian army, or that they simply convert to Christianity. Caught at this time in one of its periodic fits of nationalism and Orthodox proselytism of its numerous religious and ethnic minorities, Russia regarded the Circassian tribes as backward and took it upon itself to 'civilize' them by conversion--forcefully, if necessary--to Orthodox Christianity. The tribes rejected the Russian demands and, consequently, were attacked and massacred. This was a preplanned action intended to drive the Muslim Circassian population southward, into the Ottoman territory. In anticipation of this exodus, the Russians had negotiated a treaty with the Ottomans in 1860, whereby the latter agreed to accept 40,000-50,000 Circassian migrants. Short of manpower, the Ottoman government hoped to employ the migrants in road construction and cotton cultivation, and to bolster its armed forces.

The Circassian migration from the north soon took the form of a deluge, especially after 1863, when the Russian government began to settle the Cossack soliders in Circassia. The tribes, anxious to escape the Russian pressures, migrated south, to Anatolia, in ever increasing numbers, by sea and by land. Although figures concerning the exact number of immigrants (there were in addition, other Muslims in the Caucasus who were forced to migrate south) was 1.2 to 1.6 million. It is also estimated that some 500,000-600,000 Circassians died of various diseases or drowned in the Black Sea. In any case, about 1.1 million Circassians settled in the Ottoman state, mostly in Anatolia, where they were joined, after 1878, by their brethren from the Balkans. A number of them also settled in Syria and in Palestine, mostly in the Golan region and in the Nablus area."⁵⁰

⁵⁰Karpat, K. H., "Ottoman Immigration Politics and Settlement in Palestine," Settler Regimes in Africa and the Arab World, 1974, p. 64.

The campaign of the Russians to displace the Circassians is recalled with the greatest possible bitterness, and all accounts of Circassian history, written by Circassians, include at least one and usually several accounts of the event. The following passage is typical:

The fight for the Caucasus was at an end; the time of suffering for the Circassians was, however, to last much longer. Prince Voronzoff, the conquerer, tried to act with political acumen and wished to grant a measure of self-government to the peoples of the Caucasus. But he came up against the bitter opposition of the Russian bureaucracy and was obliged to give in. The already active Panslavists were too strong for him...Alexander II, a kindly and chivalrous man, tried to do some good, particularly to the nobles, and formed a Circassian Bodyguard who remained true and loyal to him. The former enemies became the most trustworthy of vassals, for a nobleman does not break his oath. The Tsar endeavored to reconcile us, in the same way as he treated the Finns and Balts, but his governors were--Russian governors, which means that very soon unbelievable tyranny reigned, under which my family suffered amongst others. Throughout the villages, savage and drunken Cossacks were set over the peasants, those hated men who laid the land to waste, killed the men and drove the women and girls to death through savage violation. The immigrant Russian peasants and Cossacks let the land go to ruin; they were no farmers. The last traces of the centuries old Circassian culture were destroyed, a culture which had aroused wonder and astonishment in Prince Voronzoff; the starving, impoverished mountain peoples became bandits. From the landed nobility most of their possessions were taken by so called purchase, but few silver roubles exchanged hands over a deal, and many families were brought to ruin.⁵¹

The migration of the Circassians from the Caucasus to various parts of the Ottoman Empire is a subject which could easily comprise several theses.

⁵¹Tuganov, M. B., From Tsar to Cheka, S. Low Marston and Co. Ltd., 1936, p. 13.

One of the most severe problems the Circassians had during their migration was disease, which was to plague the migrants for years to come. Apparently the Circassians had been protected from several of the more prevalent scourges during their existence in the Caucasus. Typhus, and malaria are prominently mentioned among the diseases which took the largest toll.⁵²

One contingent of Circassians, perhaps as many as 15,000-20,000⁵³ were settled in Bulgaria in 1864 by the Ottoman government. The Circassians were settled with a contingent of 12,000 Crimean Tartars on land taken from the Bulgarian peasants without compensation. Relations between the immigrants and local populace were understandably hostile and in 1875, when insurrection against the Ottoman government broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovia, the passions of the native inhabitants became inflamed. In May of 1876 insurrection broke out in the district of Phileppopolis, the site of the Circassian and Tarter settlements. The Circassians were called to arms and a series of massacres ensued. These events became widely publicized and for this, as well as numerous other reasons, war broke out between Russian and the Ottoman Empire. The war was an unqualified victory for the Russians and was concluded on 3 March 1878⁵⁴

⁵²Papers Respecting the Settlement of Circassian Emmigrants in Turkey, Sessional Papers 1864, Harrison and Sons, 1864, p. 579.

⁵³Encyclopedia Britanica, 11th ed., "Balkan Peninsula".

⁵⁴Ibid.

by the Treaty of San Stefano which was found to be unacceptable by the other great powers. The Treaty of Berlin was subsequently drafted and signed on 13 July of the same year. What both treaties had in common was a clause which stipulated that all Ottoman colonists, specifically the Tartars and Circassians, would be moved to areas within the Ottoman Empire. By the end of 1878 the Circassians had again been displaced to sites in Turkey and other Ottoman controlled areas.

III. THE CIRCASSIANS IN JORDAN

There exists no historical data as to the exact date that the Circassians settled in Jordan but the time can be closely approximated. British writers frequently travelled through the area, usually researching biblical/geographical works. H. B. Tristram travelled through the area of Amman in 1876 and found only ruins.⁵⁵ Another English traveller, Laurence Oliphant found some settlers there in 1880.⁵⁶ The most descriptive account of the early Circassian settlement in Amman is furnished by Claude R. Conder in his book Heth and Moab.⁵⁷ The passage describes his impressions of the Circassian colony as he found it in 1881.

The Circassian colony at Amman is one of several planted by the Sultan in Peaea. These unhappy people, chased from their homes by the Russians, and again driven from their new settlements scattered in the wilderness, where land has been assigned them to cultivate. They have, however, the listless and dispirited look of exiles who find it impossible to take root in the uninviting district to which they have been sent. Hated by the Arab and Fellah, despoiled of money and possessions, and having seen many of their bravest fall or die of starvation, they seem to have no more courage left, and will probably die

⁵⁵Tristram, H. B., Bible Places and the Topography of the Holy Land, London, 1878.

⁵⁶Oliphant, L., Land of Gilead, London, 1880, p. 72.

⁵⁷Conder, C. R., Heth and Moab: Explorations in Syria in 1881 and 1882, Richard Bently and Son, 1883.

out by degrees, or become scattered among the indigenous population. Our appearance at Amman at once aroused their apprehensions. They believed us to be the pioneers of a power which was about to seize the country, and anxiously inquired whether they would be allowed to remain where they were in case of an English or French occupation. It was in vain that I protested that our work had no connection with politics. The Emir begged hard to be made the confidant of a secret which, he insisted, we knew, and I was at length obliged, in order to get rid of him, to express the opinion, that whether French or English took Syria, there was no reason to suppose his settlement would be disturbed, or that he would (as he seemed chiefly to fear) be given up to the tender mercies of the Russians.⁵⁸

The assumption that a large number of Circassians who settled in Amman and the surrounding area were part of the peoples settled and later displaced from the Balkans is supported by several other works. Miss Goodrich Freer states,

"The Circassians of east Jordan land seem to have first left their home in the Caucasus, Korimolsk or Kakupschi, about the year 1860, and to have wandered in search of a home where they might be privileged to live under Moslem rule. Their leader, the Emir Huh Bey, a major in the Russian army, conducted them first to Asia Minor, and finally, after many difficulties and disappointments, about 1878, to this district, which they call the edge of the desert!"⁵⁹

The foremost Jordanian-Circassian authority on early Circassian history also traces the first Circassian settlers from the Balkans:

The Circassians who had gone to the Balkans as emigrees subsequently left those regions owing to the Russian penetration of the Ottoman lands in 1877, and resettled in Anatolia. A small part of them came to Syria and Jordan where the Ottoman State gave them agricultural land on which to live. The Shapsoghs were the first tribe to leave Turkey on a ship which caught fire while at sea. About

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 161.

⁵⁹Freer, G., In a Syrian Saddle, London, 1905, p. 53.

seven hundred were burnt to death, and the survivors landed in Acre, then moved to Nablus where they stayed for a year before crossing the Jordan and settling in Amman. In 1880 groups of Kabardians and Bzadughes migrated to Jordan. Others migrated at other times and founded seven villages in Trans-Jordan, including Amman, which later became the capital of Jordan. In 1905 a small number of Chechens and some Daghestani families also migrated to Trans-Jordan.⁶⁰

The most detailed account of the Circassian settlement in Amman is contained in Modern Amman by Miss Jane Hacker. She states:

The first group of settlers to arrive in Amman was about 50 families of the Shapsough tribe, who lost 700 members of their group at sea when their ship caught fire. They came via Acre and Nablus and their journey took over a year. A second group of 25 families arrived in 1880, and in the same year another group coming via Bulgaria settled in the neighboring village of Wadi es Sir.

Some years later a third group of immigrants arrived, some 77 families having made their way from Mersin in Turkey. They were the survivors of a battle in the Caucasus. They were called the "new settlers" as distinct from the original group, who settled at the western end of Wadi 'Amman, on the north bank of the stream and gave the district its present name of Mohajarin (refugees).

Richard Sanger in his book Where the Jordan Flows provides a concise and complete chronology of Circassian settlement throughout Jordan.

It was under Abdul Hamid that the reconquest of Transjordan from the Bedouin began. At his direction some twelve thousand Circassian refugees from the Russian Caucasus moved into the eastern highlands in the late 1870's and took over the best water-holes. By this move the Sublime Porte removed the problem of hordes of Circassian refugees in Turkey, while at the same time creating a bulwark against Bedouin in Transjordan.

The year 1880 saw two more waves of Circassian immigrants reach Transjordan; a large party from the Qabartay (Kabardey) tribe came to Amman, while another from the Batharogh (Bzedough) settled about eight miles

⁶⁰ Mufti, S., Heros and Emperors in Circassian History, Librarie Du Liban, 1972, p. 273.

west of that city around the clear springs of Wadi Seir. Two years later the colony in Amman was reinforced by a second group of Qabartay (Kabardey), who pitched their tents a little west of the first arrivals in what is now known as the Muhajireen Quarter. Muhajireen means immigrants, and many people mistakenly think this refers to refugees from the Palestine War, rather than to this much earlier group of Circassian refugees from the persecutions of the Tsar.

In 1901 still more Circassians arrived from Turkey and founded the village of Naour, where the new Point IV road starts down into the Valley of Jordan. Then about 1907, members of another tribe, the Chechens, also immigrated to Transjordan, taking up land around the springs at Zerka, later made famous by the Arab Legion, and at Swaileh and Shuneh on the road between Amman and the Jordan river. Finally, in 1909, a last group of Qabartay moved into the area around the springs at Ruseifeh ten miles east of Amman. All of these groups called themselves Hijrat, which is their word for immigrant. At first the various Circassian tribes had difficulty talking to one another, but gradually their dialects merged, and now they all understand each other adequately and are flourishing in their adopted land.⁶¹

Fredric Peake in his work History and Tribes of Jordan, adds that an additional contingent of Circassians settled in Jerash in 1885.⁶² The omission of this information by Mr. Sanger is understandable since Mr. Peake's book has been criticized for his poor treatment of Circassian tribes. This aspect will be discussed later. Most other authors (Hacker, Patai, Toukan) state that Jerash was established by Circassians but fail to give a date.

Additional information obtained from private correspondence with Ahmad Mohager Shordom, a retired Jordanian Army

⁶¹Sanger, R. H., Where the Jordan Flows, The Middle East Institute, 1963, p. 264.

⁶²Peake, F. G., History and Tribes of Jordan, University of Miami Press, 1958, p. 222.

officer,⁶³ strengthens the conclusion that the majority of Circassian immigrants came to Jordan by way of Bulgaria. Mr. Shordom stated, "The real primary route for Circassians who settled in Jordan was from Circassia to Bulgaria to Turkey, then to Jordan."⁶⁴


The chart below and map on the following page summarize the information available as to the chronology of Circassian migrations into Jordan.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>
Amman	Between 1875-1879
Amman	1880
Wadi Seir	1880
Amman	1882
Jerash	1885
Naour	1901
Suweilih	Between 1901-1909
Ruseifeh	1909

A detailed discussion of the Circassians in Jordan requires a knowledge of the tribes and major divisions among them. Thus far this thesis has dealt with the Circassians as a whole, in part because the tribal and family distinctions were not necessary in such a broad

⁶³Private Correspondence with B. G. (Ret.) A. M. Shordom, Amman, Jordan, 1 March 1979.

⁶⁴Ibid.



treatment of Circassian history, but also because the sheer complexity of the subject made it impossible. The subject of the tribal and family divisions among the Circassians settling in Jordan is still complex but had been reduced to somewhat more manageable proportions. At the outset it should be made clear that two groups, the Chechens and the Tartars, who in many cases accompanied the Circassians and settled with them are not considered Circassians. In the case of languages, both the Chechen (called Shishan by the Arabs) and the Tartar language are too dissimilar to be understood by the Circassians.


The Encyclopedia of Islam divided the Circassian nation into five major tribes, the Natukhay, Shapsug, Kabards, Ubekhs and Abaza.⁶⁵ Shauket Mufti, the foremost Jordanian historian on the Circassians writes, "The Circassian people originally constituted seven principal tribes: Zychs, Kerkets, Sinds, Henochs, Achins, Zanychs and Basks. But these names later changed and were replaced by the following names: Kemirgey, Kabardey, Shapsugh, Nat-Khuaj, Abzach, Bzedough, and Bask."⁶⁶ This information has been supplemented through correspondence with Mr. Ahmad Shordom, a retired Jordanian Circassian officer doing research on the subject who provided the following charts.:

⁶⁵Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 25.

⁶⁶Mufti, p. 1.

⁶⁷Shordom, 1 Mar. 1979.

The Circassian Nation



Major Divisions of the Adiga

Eastern Circassians:

Kabardey

Jillakhstiney

Baisleney

Western Circassians

Shapsugh

Natkhuey

Yekuizh

Abazak

Bzedough

Hatique (Nat-Khuaj)

Taimirguey

Khimish

Makhosh

Assimilated Tribes

Zhana

Adamey

Yegerguey

Koghurguey

Chercheney

Mr. Shordom also indicates that the Adiga and Abaza are the sole major Circassian tribes present in Jordan. The Circassians in Jordan have, since their settlement, preferred to be known only by the title Adiga. Thus it would seem that the contingent of Circassians present in Jordan were primarily from the Adiga and Abaza.

The most often quoted source on the Circassians is Fredric Peake who provides the following information on the Circassians in his book History and Tribes of Jordan:⁶⁸

Circassian Tribes

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Family Habitat</u>
Abaza	5 in Amman and 2 in Jerash
Absakh (Abazak)	36 living principally in Wadi al-Sir and Naur but also having 6 in Amman, 1 in Jerash, and 1 in Suweima
Baslinay (Baisleney)	1 in Amman
Bzadogh (Bzedough)	53 in Wadi al Sir and Naur
Hatogay (Nat-Khuaj)	2 in Naur
Jilaghistani (Jillakhstiney)	17 in Amman
Makhush (Makhosh)	1 in Amman
Obukh	1 in Naur
Qabartag (Kabarday)	65 in Amman, Suweima, Jerash, and Roseifa and 2 in Naur
Qumuq	1 in Amman

⁶⁸Peake, p. 272.

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Family Habitat</u>
Qusiha	1 in Jerash
Shabsugh (Shapsugh)	42 in Amman, Wadi al-Sir and Naur
Tartar	10 in Wadi al-Sir

A comparison of these various tribal listings was made in conjunction with a series of interviews conducted with Mr. Bak, a Circassian official working at the Jordanian Embassy in Washington D.C.⁶⁹ This compilation of all the information available, supplemented with Mr. Bak's wealth of knowledge on the subject yielded the following information:

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Principal Locations</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Abaza	Amman and Jerash	Major tribe with ties to families in Egypt
Abazak	Wadi Seir, Naur, Amman, Jerash and Suweilih	
Baisleney	Amman	Now considered part of the Kabardey
Bzedough	Naur, Wadi Seir	One of the three major tribes in Jordan
Nat-Khuaj	Naur	Now considered part of Bzadogh
Jillakhstiney	Amman	No longer in existence in Jordan
Makhosh	Amman	
Kabardey	Amman, Jerash, Suweilih, Naur and Roseifa	Largest tribe in Jordan

⁶⁹Interview with Mr. Bak, Jordanian Embassy, Washington D.C., May 25, 1978.

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Principal Locations</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Qumuq	Amman	Considered part of Kabardey
Quisha	Jerash	Small tribe
Shapsugh	Amman, Wadi Seir and Naur	One of three major tribes in Jordan, live in separate enclaves from other Circassians

For purposes of clarity the Circassian tribal situation in Jordan can be simplified even further without doing a great deal of harm to detail. The majority of Circassians in Jordan to date are either members of, or associated with one of the three major tribes, the Kabardey, principally residing in Amman, Jerash, Suweilih and recently in Zarqa, the Bzedough, in Naur, Wadi Seir and also recently in Zarqa and the Shapsugh in Wadi Seir, Amman and Naur. The reason for many of the Circassians residing in Zarqa is the presence of the major Army facilities there, a fact which will be explored later in this thesis. The only exception to this is the Quisha tribe whom , although quite small, have retained their separation from the three major tribes.

The character of the Circassian settlements was quite different from that of Arab agricultural settlements further west in Palestine. The Circassians brought with them numerous technological and cultural differences. Miss Hacker provides the following picture of the early settlement in Amman:

"The Circassians made small gardens round their houses and cultivated fruit trees and vegetables, lentels and chickpeas for their own use. They kept cows and, unlike the Arabs, used cow's milk. They had draught oxen, a few chickens, sheep, goats and horses. They were neither large-scale cultivators nor did they keep vast herds of animals, like the Bedouin. In their own land they were horsebreeders (as for example the Shapsough tribe, which has given its name to one of the busiest streets in the town), foresters and craftsmen, skilled in the use of iron and wood. In their new colony they developed their crafts and made and sold simple agricultural implements. They also became traders."⁷⁰

Additional information about the early Circassian settlements is added by Richard Sanger:

"They were the first persons to bring wheeled carts to Transjordan since the days of the Crusades. Most of them were made in Jerash, where the Circassian settlers had access to the forests on the hills of Ahlun. They also had plows and many fields in this part of Transjordan were tilled and planted for the first time in many centuries. The Circassians brought water buffaloes, which did poorly except in a few of the river beds; but the oxen and cows which they introduced, multiplied, although not as fast as the locally acquired sheep and goats which needed relatively little pasture.

The Circassians, especially those of the Qabartay (Kabardey) tribe, have always been known as breeders of fine horses and as expert horsemen. The relatively few horses they brought were well cared for, crossed with Arab studs, and have produced a sturdy strain. The Circassians, however, never liked camels and did not even use them for carrying loads."⁷¹

The key factor in the location of the early Circassian settlements was the proximity of those settlements to water. This location produced an almost instantaneous clash with the local Bedouin tribes, primarily the Adwan

⁷⁰Hacker, J. M., Modern Amman: A Social Study, Durham College, 1959, p. 13.

⁷¹Sanger, p. 265.

and Beni Sakhr Tribes. Miss Hacker gives the following information as to the attitude of the Circassian settlers:

"Considerable differences arose with their neighbors, the Bedouin. Though Moslem, the Circassian way of life had no affinity with that of the surrounding Adwan and Beni Sakhr tribesmen, and the Circassians made no attempt to adopt local ways. Like many other minorities, cultural and religious, they tended to regard themselves as the exponents of a superior culture and thus formed a close-knit and endogamous community. In appearance, dress, customs and language they differed from the Balga nomads.

Several went as volunteers in the Turkish army, and the colonists were loyal to the Turkish regime at a time when many of the Sultan's subjects were in a state of rebellion. It is easily understood that such people would not be received in a friendly fashion by the local Arabs."⁷²

Prior to a discussion of the security measures which the Circassian settlers were forced to take, it would be useful to discuss, in broad terms, the cultural characteristics which the Circassians brought to the area. This discussion will give the reader a flavor of the life style of those early settlers as well as an appreciation for the outlook of the Circassians on themselves and their surroundings. Again Miss Hacker brings us a picture of the Circassian characteristics and culture in the early settlements:

Physically they (the Circassians) were taller and larger-boned, grey-eyed and fairer in complexion than the Arabs. In place of the Arab abaya and Keffiyeh, the Circassian men wore a kalpak (the high astrakhan cap which was later to become part of the uniform of the Palestine police), a high necked blouse, a redingote encircled by a cartridge belt and Russian boots. They carried a long, straight dagger, decorated with fine silverwork, a gun and a courbash. This costume is still worn by the Royal Guard, a group of Circassians which, since the time of the Amir Abdullah, has accompanied the reigning monarch on state occasions. The women wore a long loose dress and a small cap with a flowing veil but

⁷²Hacker, p. 14.

they did not cover the face, and they had a greater degree of independence than was customary among Moslem women. On festive occasions men and women danced together--a shocking and impious sight to the Bedouin Moslem--to the sound of a simple flute or home-made violin. Nowadays the accordeon is the favorite instrument. Their pentatonic melodies were not unlike Scottish Highland airs and quite different in character and rhythm from the Bedouin chants. They amused themselves by swordplay, by displays of horsemanship--in this they had a common interest with the Arabs--jumping their horses over fire, leaping from one galloping horse to another in the Cossack tradition. They wed within the tribe (the price of a bride was a horse and 20 Turkish gold pounds) and carried out their traditional marriage-by-abduction rites. The well-being and good of the group was the responsibility of their leader, called by the Arabs a 'despotic Sheikh'. The Circassians spoke their dialect at home, Turkish in official affairs, and rudimentary Arabic in dealing with the Tribesmen.⁷³

When discussing Circassian culture during interviews the same terms were invariably repeated. The most predominant of these was discipline, which is instilled in Circassian youth at an early age and reinforced throughout his life. Mr. George Weightman comments on this in his article "The Circassians":

In the true traditions of a warrior group, Circassians, whether male or female, are not expected to show any emotions at time of sickness or death. The individual is expected to discipline his own emotions just as he is expected to discipline himself to the orders of superiors. This cultural expectation and, indeed, the whole spirit of this proud people can be summarized by a traditional story concerning Mirza Pasha.

One day while this war-like chieftain was visiting some of his retainers, he entered the bedroom of a dying Circassian who was surrounded by his weeping female relatives. Hearing the moans and sobs of the dying man, Mirza Pasha laughed. When the man angrily inquired how he could laugh at such a time. Mirza Pasha replied that any Circassian warrior lucky enough to die in bed surrounded by his women should have no reason for complaints or sadness. Angered by Mirza Pasha's insensitivity to his pain and the approach of death, (although this, remember, is the

⁷³Ibid., p. 14.

approved Circassian attitude), the dying man cursed Mirza Pasha saying, 'May your death, be as mine and may you remember me at your time of death'. With the aristocratic manner of disdain appropriate to a Circassian chieftan, Mirza Pasha replied, 'May you live to see that I don't die thus.' Many years after the death of the man when the Pasha was about to die himself, he apparently remembered the vow of the dying man. However, the manner was not to be the same. Rising from his bed, Mirza Pasha spent many hours stoically in a hard chair until he quietly and without any complaints or show of emotion died.⁷⁴

Another cultural characteristic which has surfaced during interviews has been that of loyalty or respect for superiors. While it may seem at the outset that these two characteristics are at least dissimilar, in the Circassian concept they are inter-related. Loyalty, once given, whether voluntarily to an outside power, such as the Ottoman Empire or Hashemite Kingdom, or by birth to a family is steadfast and unquestioning. Thus in a sea of rebellion the Circassians remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire until that empire ceased to exist. Tied to this concept is a custom which Mr. Weightman discusses:

"Although the system of ceremonial abduction has long attracted the attention of romantic outsiders, their most interesting cultural practice from the sociological point of view has often escaped the notice of observers despite the continued strength of its sanctions. The Circassians practice what for want of a better word may be termed 'brother avoidance'. Anthropologists have recorded that many societies practice 'in-law avoidance' to minimize social conflicts and a few even practice 'brother-sister' avoidance to minimize the feared potentialities of incest. But this observer knows of no other society which has gone so far to curb formally the universal possibilities of sibling rivalry. Younger brothers do not simply defer to their older brothers; they are expected to minimize contact with them. Thus, if a man arrives at a dance party, social gathering, club, or restaurant and finds one of his brothers already there, he is expected

⁷⁴Weightman, p. 30.

to withdraw discreetly. Brothers--especially younger brothers--never introduce their friends, or business associates to their older brothers. If such introductions are deemed necessary or desirable, it is expected that the introductions will be done by others. Along with brother avoidance tends to go a pattern of social strain and tension between fathers and sons. Some Circassian adult males have literally never had any direct conversation with their fathers. Such a situation is considered a commendable example of proper filial respect."⁷⁵

This custom of, as Mr. Weightman terms it, "brother avoidance" has been confirmed by interviews which I have conducted, however not to the degree which he pictures. However, respect for elders, both within the family and without, is a cultural characteristics which is heavily emphasized.

The image which emerges of the Circassian culture should be one of a warrior race, agrarian in nature, with several highly developed and emphasized cultural traits. A sociological study of the subject would probably trace the development of these characteristics and give several reasons for each. For the purposes of this thesis, it is enough that a basic understanding is developed of the outlines of the way in which the Circassians view themselves and their culture.

Frequent references have been made as to the enmity which existed between the Circassians and the local Arab tribes. Most sources attribute the establishment of the Circassians by the Ottoman government in the early settlements as an attempt to provide a buffer between the settled areas

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 29.

in Palestine and the desert tribes. The following passage is typical:

"The Turks took measures to gain control of Transjordan through and establishment of security by bringing into the territory a number of Circassians...In 1870 the Turks began to send them to Transjordan; they gave them land grants and helped them establish villages and towns as counterforces against the roaming bedouins. The Turks hoped that the mutual antagonisms would serve their purpose; they would be able to establish their authority by sponsoring the settlement of the Circassians."⁷⁶

Thus from the outset, security became a primary objective for the Circassians. Again Jane Hacker provides an excellent account of the situation:

"Before the colony could expand and prosper the Circassians had to make their position secure and they had to do so by their own efforts. Although they had the moral support of the Sultan and the Administration, material support in the form of soldiers or police was entirely lacking. The nearest gendarmerie post was Es Salt, twenty miles distant along a rough track, with no postal or telegraphic communication. The Arabs resented the intrusion of the newcomers into any part of what they considered their grazing ground or grain lands, whether these lands were left idle or not."⁷⁷

A more colorful account of the experiences of the Circassian settlers in Syria, about 1880, which would also have been fairly typical of the Transjordanian Circassians, is given by the Circassian author Moussa Bey Tuganoff:

These (the Syrian Circassians) had established a regular settlement in their new country, near the border where the Turkish government had allowed them to settle. Land had been placed at their disposal and they were protected by the government. Villages sprang up, the

⁷⁶Shwadran, B., Jordan: A State of Tension, Council for Middle Eastern Press, 1959, p. 92.

⁷⁷Hacker, p. 14.

land was cultivated, and the old customs of the homeland continued, as did the dress and speech. Nor did the settlers swords and kindjal rust for long, for the Turks welcomed the advent of so many brave men and had not presented them with land entirely for disinterested reasons. Here on the frontier lived the wild, uncivilized tribes of Druses and Beduin who had already caused the authorities no little worry and cost them several punitive expeditions. The banditry and feuds continued, however, and rebellion was the order of the day.

These two tribes were accustomed to prey upon defenseless, peaceable country people, and an encounter between their hordes and the Circassians could only give rise to bloody combat. Bit by bit the Circassians won their new home from the raiders, and many a dead Beduin carried the kindjal in his breast, while Circassian women wept over the terrible wounds caused by the yaghatan, which penetrated the soft cherkesska all too easily. The Circassians became the leaders of the Turkish expeditions against the tribesmen, and in this way their worth as fighters was discovered, and many of them were called to positions of authority in the Government and at court, where they became famous for their loyalty and trustworthiness.⁷⁸

The Peace Handbook published in 1920 gives by far the best summation of the security situation of the early Circassians:

The colonists were to be pioneers in every sense; for they had to introduce not only their ploughs where nomad Arabs had been content to pasture, but also in the eighties their own government and police; for neither the Jaulan nor the Balqa (areas) would the Imperial government organize permanently its administrations or garrisons till 1895. The land assigned where mostly government property according to the letter of the Ottoman law, since, no doubt, they had neither paid tax nor been tilled within the prescribed term, nor indeed at any time. But Ottoman law had not run in Transjordan and the nomads and half-settled Arab villagers held that the lands so disposed of were, in fact, theirs. Accordingly local enmity to the colonists was assured from the outset...The government consistently supported its colonists, rounding up more than once on their behalf as irreconcilable tribe or clan, as for example, the Abbad Arabs near Es Salt or a section of the Beni Hasan near Jerash, and sending it to cool its passions west of Jordan or in the eastern desert; and the Cherkess have been able to hold on...In Transjordan measures were taken to compel settlement along arable fringes. These measures took the

⁷⁸Tuganoff, p. 43.

form of free or favorable grants of land, opening of local markets, establishment of administrative posts and police caracols, and lately (1920) road construction...In the Transjordanian country, where settlement had been slowly spreading for a generation amid a welter of tribal claims and feuds, the government undertook at last in the nineties to assure and promote the process by establishing garrisoned posts from Kuneitra southwards and by introducing administrative machinery of the same type as in Syria. A Mutassarif appeared at Kerak for example in 1895 and Kaimmakams and Mudirs followed throughout the Balqa region.⁷⁹

Miss Hacker recounts an interview with the eminent Circassian historian Dr. Shaqat al Mufti, the brother of Said al Mufti, of which a great deal will be written later in this paper. Miss Hacker writes:

"The way in which the Circassians of Amman gained their immunity from attack was recounted by Dr. Mufti. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was an endemic cold war between the settlers and the Bedouin which broke out sporadically into shooting affrays. The Bedouin of east Jordan kept the villagers of the marginal lands, Circassian and Christian alike, in a constant state of fear and suspense, as much by their boasts and taunts as by their prowess in sudden raids. The Circassians of Amman were not deterred by this psychological warfare. They returned taunt for taunt and boast for boast. Dr. Mufti tells how his grandfather replied to the threats of the Beni Sakhr sheikh in the following words: 'I have fought many men; and I have the scars of seven wounds on my body; if you want to fight, then fight. But be sure to bring enough camels to carry away your corpses.'"⁸⁰

The friction between the Circassians and the Bedouins finally erupted into open warfare in 1900 in an incident known as the "Balqawiyeh War". A Circassian maiden from Amman had been kidnapped by some Arabs from the Balqawi

⁷⁹Great Britain, Peace Handbooks, No. 60 Syria and Palestine cited by Hacker, p. 15.

⁸⁰Hacker, p. 15.

tribe. A pitched battle was fought between the Circassians, assisted by the Bani Sakhr Beduin tribe and the Balqawi at Quweismeh. The Circassians had concluded a mutual assistance pact with the Bani Sakhr and the Bani Sakhr honored the agreement and came to the Circassians assistance. The combined Circassian/Bani Sakhr force won the battle, and a period of relative peace and security began. It was this security which encouraged the migration of merchants and craftsmen from Syria and Palestine.⁸¹

The local Arab tribes were not the only enemy the Circassians found it necessary to fight. The Circassians relied upon rain, rather than irrigation and a drought could destroy their crops completely. The usual drought cycle in this area is one year in seven. They grew a mixture of wheat and barley which was particularly hardy and suitable to the area. But even in years in which ample rain was received other natural enemies took their toll. As Sanger recounts,

"During the last few years locusts have been fought by the Jordanian forces and by international anti-locust patrols. Up until World War I, however, such modern organizations were unknown in Transjordan, and the Circassians had to resort to their own primitive methods of fighting the black swarms of hungry insects. In addition to beating drums and burning smoky fires, they regularly dispatched missions to Turkey, who brought back 'locust water'. This liquid came from areas in Turkey which were free of locusts and had been blessed by persons known to have special powers against insects. Fields properly treated

⁸¹Mufti, p. 275.

with 'locust waters' were believed by the Circassians to be locust repellent and farmers whose fathers spent good money for this remarkable liquid still boast of its potency."⁸³

The arrival of the Hejaz railroad in 1905 brought both prosperity and challenge to the Circassians. Trains ran from Damascus to Maan three times weekly⁸⁴ and a railway station established three kilometers east of Amman served as a link to the outside world and brought both traders and settlers to the area. But some of the Bedouin tribesmen saw the railway as a threat to the revenues they had heretofore collected from pilgrims using the route to Mecca. Additionally the railway bypassed Es Salt, the largest Transjordanian settlement located to the north-west of Amman. The Circassians were called into service by the Turks and the Ottoman officials lost no time in enlisting the services of the Circassians which they had used with such efficiency in Syria. By 1907 a two hundred man cavalry unit had been formed at Kurach and units were dispatched to patrol the line. This unit remained in being until World War I and saw limited service against the British.⁸⁵

⁸³Ibid., p. 266.

⁸⁴Hacker, p. 19.

⁸⁵Vatikiotis, P. J., Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921-1957, Praeger, 1967, p. 73.

By the advent of World War I the Circassian settlements had been established as secure and permanent settlements, with Amman as the hub. Miss Hacker gives this picture of Amman in 1914:

"Although Amman remained a predominantly Circassian community until World War I, with approximately 300 families in 1914, its growing success as a trading center attracted traders, both Moslem and Christian from elsewhere. Some of the first non-Circassian arrivals were Christian merchants from Es Salt...Syrian Moslems also came from Damascus to open up shops in Amman, and no doubt some of the fifty Christian families established under the protection of the Church at Madaba during 1880 also sought the greater safety of Amman.⁸⁶

The establishment of such a large number of merchants and traders from other areas is at least partially due to the traditional dislike of the Circassians for trade. As Dr. Weightman states, "The Circassian conventional disdain for mercantile pursuits is so strong that one can literally count the number of families directly connected with trade on the fingers of one hand--with two or three fingers to spare."⁸⁷

The political situation of the Circassians at this time was fairly straightforward. The Ottoman administration routinely preferred to deal with one representative of any given minority under their supervision and the Circassians were no exception. Mirza Pasha, who has previously been

⁸⁶Hacker, p. 19.

⁸⁷Weightman, p. 28.

mentioned, is today considered to be the last of the true Circassian "chiefs" in that he both represented the Circassians as a whole in dealings with the Ottoman government and was responsible for the Circassian tribes in the area to the administration. Although his leadership was challenged prior to World War I he appeared to be fairly secure in his position.

Mirza Pasha was not one of the original Circassian settlers in Amman. He arrived approximately 1907 from Lebanon where a portion of his tribe, the Shapsogh had been settled.⁸⁸ Mirza Pasha had occupied an official governmental position with the Ottoman Empire prior to his arrival in Jordan and thus had already established official ties with the administration. He was famous, in the model of most Circassian leaders, for his integrity, valor and religious fanaticism. Usually travelling with two horses, since he could outlast one of them, he quickly established himself as the leader of all of the tribes with the exception of the Kabardey. The Kabardey were led by Muhammad el Mufti who was one of the original settlers.⁸⁹ His son, Said el Mufti emerges as a very powerful political figure in later years.

These then were the major strains of the early Circassian settlement from what sketchy details emerge from books and

⁸⁸Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.

⁸⁹Mr. Bak and LTC Jamal, 26 May 1978.

interviews. A group of flourishing settlements, periodically harassed by the Bedouin, supporting the Turks both in spirit and with arms. Miss Hacker pictures Amman as follows:

The Amman of the early twentieth century was a small, self-contained, largely self-sufficient community. It was a sizeable village of a few thousand inhabitants--middlemen, trading agricultural products for simple manufactured articles, for cloth, tea, sugar, kerosene and household utensils brought from Damascus and Jerusalem. The money in circulation was the silver mejidih, the equivalent of 20 piasters or five shillings, and the gold lira, the Turkish pound equal to 5 mejideh. Paper money was not thought of, and banks were unknown. Savings were carried in the form of gold coin necklaces or a decoration to a women's headdress. Houses and shops lay in the valley hidden from the approaching traveler. Rough earth roads converged on the village from Wadi Seir and Naur, sister settlements to the west and south-west respectively; from Madaba to the south; from Zerqa to the north-east and the railway, and the desert on the east. From Es Salt came tax collectors, soldiers and the weekly postman with his two guards. Travelers journeyed on horse or camel back; goods were carried by ox cart; by four wheeled, horse drawn wagons or by camel train. One Turkish administrative officer alone was responsible for all administrative affairs."⁹⁰

World War I in Transjordan did very little to change the basic fabric of society although it did change the physical surroundings. The Circassian settlements, most especially Amman, remained loyal to the Ottoman government and provided recruits and intelligence. Unfortunately the forests which surrounded the Circassian settlements, to include those which were part of orchards and private gardens, were cut down to provide fuel for the trains on the Hejaz railways. Amman served as a distributing point for Ottoman supplies and several thousand Turkish and German troops were stationed there. But for the most part this area remained a backwater

⁹⁰Hacker, p. 20.

in the war, important only in that it served as a link to other areas, chiefly Damascus to the north. Building and construction increased greatly and the Circassian communities enjoyed something of a war-time boom. Several attacks were made by the British to capture Amman but there were primarily secondary efforts and were repulsed.

The major problem in analyzing the Circassian role in the war is that few if any accounts specify the nationality of troops engaged in the skirmishes which occurred in the area and little historical information could be drawn even in the event that they did. The Ottoman forces at this time were a mixture of minorities and Turks, and even if accounts did state that an action had been taken against Circassians, which none do, the question as to the origin of these Circassians would still be unanswered. Circassians were settled in several locations in Turkey, with a large settlement in Syria. Thus the only action involving Circassians which we can be sure involved those of the local variety was after the Turkish and German troops departed. On 24 September 1918⁹¹ the German and Turkish troops had completely evacuated Amman and the surrounding area, and on 25 September 1918⁹² the Australian Light Horse under General Chaytor entered the city and met with light resistance which was more in the form of harassment than defense. The British

⁹¹Ibid., p. 22.

⁹²Ibid., p. 22.

forces quickly cleared this resistance and were shortly thereafter met by a deputation of local leading citizens which informed the British that no Ottoman troops remained in the city and requested no measures be taken against the people or property of the town. Miss Hacker summarizes the effect which World War I had on Amman:

"So ended World War I in Amman, with a little loss and some gain. The greatest loss to the town was not the occasional bomb hit on the station buildings but the destruction of the trees...Otherwise the town emerged from the war in a rather better position than it had been in before. It was now an established commercial center; it had an increased and more cosmopolitan trading population, which had been made prosperous by army contacts, though gold had been replaced by a paper currency. At the same time there was a metaled road to Es Salt, a post and telegraphic service through Es Salt, a primary school for boys, and a Municipal Council to administer local affairs. It survived the next two years of political chaos to welcome the Amir Abdullah in 1921.⁹³

⁹³Ibid., p. 23.

IV. THE CIRCASSIAN UNDER AMIR ABDULLAH

"Political chaos" is a very descriptive term to apply to the events of the two years following World War I. The situation is described in the following passage:

To the east of Palestine there lay the romantic mountainous country called Transjordan, through which the forces of the revolt had hacked their way northwards to Damascus. Under the peace treaties it had been placed, like Palestine, under the mandatory rule of Great Britain, but the British were much too busy to bother with it, and its status remained indistinct. It had no resources whatsoever and was often overlooked, as an unimportant corner of Syria, in the controversies aroused by Sykes, Picot and the rest. Nor was anybody sure whether the Balfour Declaration applied to it. Feisal administered it for a time, during his short-lived sovereignty in Damascus, and King Hussein had temporarily annexed the southern part of the country, up to Maan; but by 1921 most of it had relapsed into bewildered disunity.

Three separate autonomous Governments had been sponsored by the preoccupied British to rule its 350,000 people, and six Arabic-speaking Englishmen tried to instill some sense of civic logic into the place...In this they failed. Hastily and hazily assembled into Council of Elders, the chieftains evolved their laws and administered their judgement with a blith disregard for precedent, sometimes declining into tribal feuds, sometimes reviving their fortunes by selling worthless oil concessions to perepatitic adventurers. There was a National Government of Noab, whose President was a young Englishman called Alec Kirkbride; and up the road there was a Government of Amman, whose President was Kirkbride's younger brother Alan; and most of these young Britons seem to have had a pleasant time with their likeable unruly wards; and the Arab chieftains were, by and large, not altogether displeased with their free and easy, hit and run, trigger-happy form of society.⁹⁴

This situation continued until 21 August 1920 when,⁹⁵ in an effort to bring the area greater political stability,

⁹⁴Morris, J., The Hashemite Kings, Patheon Books Inc., 1959, p. 87.

⁹⁵Bentwich, N., England in Palestine, London, 1932, p. 52.

the first British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, met with a collection of notables in Es Salt and proposed the formation of five local autonomous areas, Ajlan, Deir Yusuf, Jerash, Es Salt and Al Karak. The common characteristics of the five were, "none had international political status, each was under the guidance of a British political officer, the most powerful local tribal chief was made governor and each government had a representative advisory council."⁹⁶

This arrangement does not appear to have involved any Circassians, at least as far as records and interviews can ascertain. The position of the Circassians was particularly insecure at this time owing to their support of the Ottoman effort during the war and the preference which the British exhibited for dealing with the Arab tribes. However, while the British did avoid dealing with certain Circassian leaders in the post war era, such as Mirza Pasha, it should be remembered that the Circassians retained, in the minds of the English public, the image which had been created for them in their struggles with the Russians. Additionally the Circassians more closely resembled the English in their physical appearance. The Circassians still regarded the British as their supporters, against the Russians, notwithstanding the conflicts of the last war. But primary in the situation of the Circassian was their need for a sponsor of some

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 52.

type. The Circassians had been under the continuous sponsorship of a major power for several centuries and the lack of such sponsorship was a new and dangerous situation, especially in the chaotic political atmosphere of Transjordan. As Aqil Abidi points out the British attempt to stabilize the area was a failure:

"Many Transjordanians were not pleased with this arrangement. Desire for a single Arab state and apprehension of the Zionists persisted. These were clearly reflected in a 16 point petition presented to Major F. R. Somerset, the British Political officer at Umm Qays in Ajlun, by a number of Shaykhns. The petition demanded an Arab Amir, no relationship with the Palestine government, check on Zionist immigration and fixation of the River Jordan as the western boundary of the area. The British Government conceded some of their points and noted the others. But the factors which obstructed the British experiment were the continuing tribal turbulence on the one hand and the lack of co-ordination among the local governments on the other. British political officers, on their part, played one government off against the other with consummate skill. British anxiety was increased when, following repeated raids by the tribesmen of the area into Syria, the French Government hinted at its annexation. In addition, Britain was harassed by a set of complex war-time problems developing in Palestine, Iraq, Nejd and the Hejaz. At this juncture, the appearance of Prince Abdullah, the second son of Sharif Husain, at Maan in November 1920, decided Britains next move. What followed subsequently gave a new turn to Transjordan's history, leading to the creation of an Amirate."⁹⁷

Emir Abdullah arrived in Maan, an area in southern Transjordan currently under the control of the Hejaz government, on 11 November 1920 with the express and intention of raising an army and marching on Damascus to restore his brother, Faisal, to the throne of Syria. Upon

⁹⁷Abidi, A. H. H., Jordan A Political Study 1948-1957, Asia Publishing House, 1965, p. 5.

his arrival he was received with very mixed reactions and was warned, by telegram from the governor of Salt, that if he had come for political purposes he would be met with opposition. Abdullah replied, "I am visiting Trans-jordan to occupy as directed by the Royal Arab Government of Syria, I am acting for His Majesty King Faisal and it is your duty to receive your orders from me."⁹⁸

Abdullah then declared himself regent for his brother Faisal, set up the temporary headquarters of the Arab government of Syria and issued his call for a "jihad" to liberate Syria from the French. The British took no action other than to diplomatically attempt to dissuade Abdullah, since they were bound to support the French mandate under the agreements reached at the San Remo Conference.

While at Maan, Abdullah was joined by a large number, perhaps several hundred⁹⁹ former army officers and administrative officials from Faisal's short lived government. These were to be part of the core of Abdullah's government and would also cause much disaffection for Abdullah and his administration during the early years of the Emirate. In early January 1921 Abdullah dispatched one of his aides, Sharif Ali al-Harithi, to Amman to secure the support of the local nationalists. In a series of meetings al-Harithi convinced the majority of notables in Amman that support for Abdullah was the most wise of all possible alternatives.

⁹⁸Abdullah, I., Memoirs of King Abdullah, The Philosophical Library, 1960, p. 193.

⁹⁹Mahmoud, A. A., "King Abdullah and Palestine" (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, April 1972).

Abdullah arrived in Amman on 9 February 1921¹⁰⁰ and was met by a large contingent of notables from Amman and the surrounding villages. Present among them were Mirza Pasha and Othman Hickmat, the two major Circassian leaders to emerge from World War I and the following two years of political chaos. Muhammad and Said el-Nufti may also have been among them, accounts vary as to their presence, but it is very likely that they would also be present at such an important event.

For both Abdullah and the Circassians the logical attraction was too strong to be ignored. Emir Abdullah had by this time received several communications from his brother Faisal and his father King Hussein discouraging him from continuing his campaign to liberate Syria. The logical alternative was the establishment of some type of local government in the Transjordan area, sponsored by the British and ruled by Abdullah. The Circassians were a stable minority, with a tradition of successful military activity against the Arab tribes of the area. They owned a large portion of the land in Amman and the surrounding area. With the Arab nationalist sentiments currently on the rise, they were in a particularly insecure position.

For the Circassians, Abdullah was the ideal sponsor. He fit both the cultural and political model for a leader which the Circassians had traditionally followed. Abdullah was

¹⁰⁰Mahmoud, p. 19.

a devout Moslem, with an impeccable geneology, he was familiar with Circassians as a result of his service in Constantinople, he was in need of a loyal local military force and finally, he possessed the largest military force in the immediate area. Mirza Pasha and Othman Hickmat both immediately volunteered to join Abdullah in his campaign to liberate Syria.¹⁰¹ They also proposed the formation of a personal bodyguard for the Emir, composed of Circassians in their traditional combat dress. This offer was accepted and a forty man unit was formed, which remains to this day. The Circassians had allied themselves with Abdullah, firmly and openly, at a time in which Abdullah's fortunes were unsure. This was never forgotten by Abdullah and was referred to on several occasions.¹⁰²

The events which led to the British decision to install Abdullah as Emir of the newly created state of Transjordan are discussed in great depth in several excellent works by Glubb, Peake and others.

Once installed as Emir, Abdullah was faced with a number of situations upon which the success of his reign was to hang.

The first major decision was the selection of a capital. Abdullah was confronted with two major choices in this

¹⁰¹Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.

¹⁰²Interview with LTC Jamal and Mr. Bak, Jordanian Embassy, Washington D.C., 26 May 1978.

regard, Amman or Es Salt. Amman was chosen, a critical choice to the political future of the Circassians. The choice of Amman was made most probably because of its location and position as a commercial center. Es Salt had been the major administrative center under the Ottoman Empire, but the population, almost evenly divided Moslems and Christians, had a history of social and political instability. The decision to adopt Amman as the capital was formalized in the 1928 law which was quite advantageous to the Circassians and will be discussed further.

Abdullah's second move was to establish, in July 1921,¹⁰³ a Council of Ministers responsible to him. This council did not represent the local Transjordanian populace, but rather was predominantly composed of Syrian followers of Faisal who still believed that Abdullah would march north and free Syria from the French. These were members of the Istiqlal party and their leader, Rashid Tali, was installed as the first President of the Advisory Council. Nor did Abdullah attempt to disabuse the Istiqlal members of the belief that the Syrian campaign was still viable. He claimed that the British had promised him the Kingdom of Syria and the agreement to refrain from any hostile acts was temporary, for a period of six months. "In six months," said Abdullah, "Churchill would be able to congratulate us in the return of Syria to our hands."¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³Abdullah, p. 197.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 45.

The overwhelming presence of the non-Transjordanian populace in the government made an impression on Major Jarvis, the biographer of Peake Pasha who wrote:

"Every important post in the government at that time was filled by a Syrian or a Damascine Arab of the Istiglal party, whose one aim was to extract as much money as possible from Transjordan to carry on the war against France and to use the country as a base for operations in Syria."¹⁰⁵

This situation caused one Circassian leader, Said al-Mufti to openly break with Abdullah. His tribe, the Karbardey, was the largest Circassian tribe in Jordan. This opposition to Abdullah had no immediate effect, since the opposition was one of coffee-shop rhetoric rather than active measures but it did establish for Mufti the reputation of a radical background which, combined with the fact that he was a Circassian, was to provide him with opportunities in the coming years.

Although few natives were afforded the opportunity to participate in the administration, the number of Circassians who were employed in government service was much higher, by percentage of population, than the native Arab Transjordanians. This was particularly true in the military, which will be more fully covered later.

In April of 1921, matters came to a head with the members of the Istiglal party. Britain had indicated

¹⁰⁵Jarvis, C. S., Arab Command: The Biography of LTC F. G. Peake Pasha, Hutchinson, 1943, p. 107.

that British interests would not be served in the area by the continued presence of the Istiglal members in the Transjordanian government. Abdullah had, by this time, established a more complete power base with the natives of the area and saw that "his chance to secure stable rule in Transjordan and possibly extend its territorial boundaries was to support British interests completely. Thus he decided not to make any more compromises with the nationalists. He removed them from their government positions, which he then filled with less politically-minded local leaders. Next, he declared these nationalists to be 'foreigners' and consequently deprived them of all their political rights and privileges. Not only did Abdullah block their activities but he also created a legal distinction between Arabs on the basis of territory."¹⁰⁶

Another major task which confronted Abdullah was the necessity to establish security in the Emirate. Prior to his arrival this task had been the responsibility of the British government and had been undertaken by Captain F. G. Peake. Captain Peake had been sent to Amman in April 1920 to form a security force. Prior to Abdullah's arrival in Amman, Peake had little success in recruiting any force. Peake left Amman to attend the Cairo Peace Conference and upon his return was selected as one of Abdullah's British advisors and given the task of assembling a 750 man security force.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶Mahmoud, p. 33.

¹⁰⁷Jarvis, p. 118.

This force got off to a very difficult start, suffering major reverse at Kerak in April of 1922.¹⁰⁸ Early in 1923 the force was completely reorganized, the elements within it who were Syrian and therefore politically inclined, discharged and the force renamed the Arab Legion. The Transjordanian natives were still reluctant to enlist, with the exception of the Circassians, who made up perhaps as much as 30% of the force.¹⁰⁹ From this time onward the one of the two major areas of interaction between the government and Circassians became the army. In the terminology of The Civic Culture this was an area of "social mobility" in which the Circassians believed that they could achieve high status in their culture. The other area was of course, politics. This will be discussed at length in the final chapter.

The events which transpired between the British and Emir Abdullah in the Summer of 1924 have been discussed in great detail elsewhere and have little impact on the main topic of this paper other than to emphasize the insecurity of British support for Abdullah.¹¹⁰ Abdullah was in the end forced by the British to accept strict British supervision in the matter of finances and his administration on the whole was brought under tighter British control.

¹⁰⁸Peake, F. G., "Trans-Jordan" Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, July 1939, p. 382.

¹⁰⁹Mr. Bak and LTC Jamal, 26 May 1978.

¹¹⁰Dann, U., "The Political Confrontation of Summer 1924 in Transjordan," Middle Eastern Studies, May 1976, p. 159-168.

The major efforts on the part of the Emir's government between 1924 and 1927 were the establishment of public security, the construction of public works such as highways and the repair of the Hejaz railway, the establishment of a system of courts and the reorganization of land tenure and taxation. The last category was of special concern to the Circassians since their chief occupation was one of agriculture. Most of the government documents from the Ottoman period had been either lost or destroyed. The situation is described in the following passage,

"During the Turkish regime Transjordan was regarded by the Government as more of a liability than an asset, the administration, particularly in regard to land, had been very much neglected, and it was only when the Department of Lands and Surveys was formed in 1929 that land administration was placed on a firm basis.

The task that confronted this new department was indeed a formidable one. There were no maps, no surveyors, and the Land Registries were in a hopeless state of confusion. In 1926 Sir Ernest Dowson was asked by the Transjordanian Government to study the existing system of land tenure and land taxation in the country and to make recommendations as to the reforms and changes in the system of administration he considered necessary. In the body of his report the following pregnant paragraph appears:

Throughout the length and breadth of the country there will hardly be found a handful of cases in which the Government can extract from the Land Register the name of the lawful possessor of any given parcel of "miri" land (Crown lands with a heritable right of occupation by the cultivator) or in which the occupant of such land can establish therefrom his right to lawful possession. Continuously everywhere the possession of "miri" land is being disposed of, inherited and seized in disregard of law and the Land Registries and without payment of the fees prescribed."¹¹¹

¹¹¹Walpole, G. F., "Land Problems in Transjordan," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, January 1948, p. 52.

The survey of lands was undertaken in 1928 and completed in 1933. This survey gave the Circassians firm title over their lands. Not only the lands under cultivation or the sites of dwellings were assigned ownership but also tracts which were surrounded by cultivated lands such as the Wadi El HaddedeH running through what is now downtown Amman.¹¹² At the time of this survey, this land, as well as other uncultivated areas, were essentially worthless but assigned ownership nonetheless by the meticulous British administrators. As Amman and the surrounding villages grew this land became quite valuable. This topic will be dealt with more fully in subsequent passages.

The year 1928 saw the promulgation of several laws in Transjordan which had a great effect on the status of the Circassians. These laws were the outcome of the Anglo-Transjordanian agreement of 1928 which provided for the enactment of a series of laws which would pave the way for a constitutional government. The first major step was the enactment of a constitution on February 20, 1928. The Constitution heavily favored the British control or at least active supervision of all important government activities and what powers it did not grant to the British were reserved for the Emir. The important section of the document for the Circassians was the division of Transjordan into four districts and one autonomous territory. The autonomous territory was completely surrounded by the central or Belga district and

¹¹²Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.

in addition to Amman included the Circassian villages of Naur, Wadi Seir, Suweilih and Ruseifa. This effectively removed the majority of the Circassian citizens from involvement in Arab tribal politics and made them directly responsible to the Crown in the daily administration of the area. This measure benefited both the Circassian within the autonomous "territory of the capital," and the Emir. Since the Circassians were not involved with the tribal politics they were not required to engage in tribal politics and thus confuse the direct link which had been established between the Emir and themselves. This also eliminated the possibility that the Circassians, a powerful military group, would ally themselves with another tribe or collection of tribes in an effort to overthrow the administration.

The second move toward a constitutional monarchy also directly effected the Circassians. The electoral law, promulgated on 15 August 1928 contained a special section regarding minorities. This section allocated one seat be reserved for a Circassian, for every five thousand inhabitants versus the one seat for every twenty-seven thousand for the remainder of the population (excluding Christians, who also received a special legislative allocation under the law).¹¹³ This allocation was shared by the Circassians with the Chechens, another smaller group of Caucasian Muslims who migrated to Transjordan.

¹¹³Aruri, p. 40.

These three measures, the land survey, the Constitution stipulating an autonomous "capital territory" and the Legislative Law of 1928 with its special provisions for Circassian involvement in the legislature, formalized the Circassian status in Jordanian society and insured for them continued political security for as long as the Hashemite regime remained viable.

Thus far we have examined the role of the Circassians as a whole in the government and the relationship which was gradually being established and formalized between the government on the one hand and the Circassians on the other. As with any group, dealing with the group as a whole can lead to misconception, and overgeneralization.

Three major Circassian families appear to have been politically active in the central administration. The first was the Hikmat family represented by Omar Hickmat. The Hickmat family were members of the Kabardey clan and Omar Hickmat was the first Circassian to hold a post on the early Council of Ministers, as Minister of Justice. This family has remained active in government, but on an appointive, rather than elected basis and three of Omar Hickmat's sons presently serve in appointed positions in the present government.

The Mirza family also remained active in politics, represented by Mirza Pasha's son Wasfi Pasha. The Mirza family had remained staunch supporters of Abdullah, although

Mirza Pasha was never able to personally participate in politics due to British opposition.

Said al-Mufti is the most often mentioned Circassian leader and emerged as the most powerful Jordanian-Circassian politician by 1928, although his power was frequently challenged by the Mirza family, not the same Mirza family to which Mirza Pasha belonged but the family of Abbas Pasha Mirza who for several cabinets, alternated service with Said al-Mufti.

The politics of Said al-Mufti can best be described as totally loyal but also independent. Opposed to the administration during the early twenties, Said al-Mufti continued to act independently throughout the 1930's, supporting the government on most major issues but occasionally acting as a leader of the opposition. This qualified opposition enabled Mufti to survive, but also gained for him immense popularity in the disaffected portions of the Transjordanian population. This became especially important after 1948 with the advent of the Palestinians into Jordanian politics. Said al-Mufti was a member of several political parties,¹¹⁴ and was elected as the first Circassian representative to the 1929 Legislative Council, the first Legislative Council elected. The first order of business for the new Legislative Council was approval of the British-Transjordanian Agreement of 1928. The Council immediately drafted a revised Agreement

¹¹⁴The practice of simultaneous membership in two or more political parties was fairly common. See Aruri, p. 79.

to take the place of the existing Agreement. As can be expected the new agreement called for sweeping changes, both in the relationship between Transjordan and Britain and the Transjordanian government itself.¹¹⁵ Under heavy pressure and after many delays the Legislative Council finally approved the Agreement as submitted on June 4, 1929. Several months later a crisis was precipitated when the Council refused to pass the annual budget law. The Council was dissolved on February 9, 1931 and new elections held on June 1, 1931.

Throughout the two crises above Said al-Mufti had supported the government. The Second Legislative Council contained only four members who had been elected to the first, Said al-Mufti among them. None of the members of the First Legislative Council who had voted "no" on the issue of the 1928 Agreement were ever again elected to national office.¹¹⁶

One author describes the subsequent events as follows:

"Initially, the second Legislative Council was not as cooperative as the government wished it to be. The elected members excluded the government appointed members from the legal, administrative, and financial committees of the Legislative Council. Excluding them the legislative committees dramatized the separation of legislative and executive functions. Subsequently, the Legislative Council prevented the transaction of legislative activities by failing to form a quorum. The Emir was faced with two alternatives: to dissolve the Council or to concede some legislative authority. He

¹¹⁵Shwadran, p. 176.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 177.

dismissed the Chief Minister and replaced him with Ibrahim Hashem, the countries leading jurist and one of the principal pillars of the Hashemite dynasty. Hashem formed his Executive Council on November 18, 1931 of the two members of the former Council and three members of the Legislative Council. He thus conciliated the governments critics in the legislature and assured the transaction of legislative business in the Council...This marked the beginning of an uninterrupted harmonious relations between the Executive and Legislative Council, which lasted until independence."¹¹⁷

One of the three members of the Legislative Council was Said al-Mufti whom subsequently served on three of the four legislatures which met between 1931 and 1947.

Transjordan between 1931 and 1947 was a fairly peaceful country, devoid of political instability and insulated from the effects of World War II. Agriculture, government and the military were the primary careers of the Circassians. For social and recreational activities the Circassian Charity Organization was founded in 1930,¹¹⁸ with branches in Jerash, Naur, Wadi Seir and Zerqua with a women's branch founded sometime later. This organization actively promoted the preservation of Circassian customs and languages and presently sponsors twenty-one scholarships for students to study at the University of Nalchick, at present the center of Circassian study in the Caucasus. The Circassian Charity Association sponsors a school built 5 years ago, between Naur and Wadi Seir which teaches the Circassian language in addition to the other required subjects at present there are 108 students in grades 1-6.¹¹⁹ The Ahli

¹¹⁷Aruri, p. 85.

¹¹⁸"Jordanian Circassians Hang on to Their Traditions," Jordan Times, 13 May 1978, p. 2.

¹¹⁹Jordan Times, p. 2.

Sports Club was founded in 1944¹²⁰ and became the predominant force in Jordanian sports. Although non-Circassians were permitted to join, the Ahli Club was, and remains today, primarily Circassian. Several other smaller organizations and clubs also were founded for sports or cultural activities.

The 1930's are the only period in which several surveys were taken which distinguished between Circassian and non-Circassian. Subsequent censuses or surveys have not distinguished between the Jordanian citizens on the basis of ethnic background or (in the case of the Christians) religion. The reasons for this were fully covered in the introduction, little benefit would be gained from emphasizing differences which were all too prevalent. Nonetheless the British had no such sensibilities and a census taken in 1933 disclosed the following Circassian population:¹²¹

<u>Location</u>	<u>Circassian Population</u>
Amman	1,700
Wadi Seir	2,000
Jerash	1,500
Naur	500
Suweilih	<u>150</u>
Total in Transjordan	5,850

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 2.

¹²¹Great Britain, Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1933, Colonial No. 94, His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1934, p. 305.

The total population of Transjordan was given as 300,000,¹²² the Circassians thus comprising approximately 2% of the population. These figures become much more meaningful when compared to the following survey taken in 1937.¹²³

OFFICIALS OF THE TRANSJORDANIAN GOVERNMENT OTHER
THAN BRITISH (1938)

ARABS BORN IN TRANSJORDAN	539
ARABS BORN OUTSIDE TRANSJORDAN	313
CIRCASSIANS BORN IN TRANSJORDAN	68
OTHERS	<u>5</u>
	925

Thus while the Circassians comprised only 2% of the population they occupied almost 7% of the government positions, including occupancy of one of the five positions on the Executive Council.

The military was also a preferred career for the Circassians, and one in which they enjoyed great success. The Circassians preferred and continue to prefer today, to be placed in all Circassian units if possible. The explanation of the Circassian involvement in the military necessitates some background.

¹²²Great Britain, Colonial No. 94, p. 306.

¹²³Great Britain, Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nation on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1937, Colonial No. 146, His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1938, p. 314.

The initial military force organized by Captain F. G. Peake was named the Transjordanian Reserve Force and was composed primarily of Circassian and other, minority personnel, the native Transjordanians not willing to support the Force. This force was used primarily to compel tribes to pay taxes and, with the assistance of the Royal Air Force, to repel Wahhabi attacks from the south. The Transjordanian Reserve Force was initially authorized a strength of 750 men.¹²⁴ Additionally a small police force of perhaps 200 was maintained also.

On October 22, 1923¹²⁵ an order was issued to merge the police force with the Transjordanian Reserve Force and the unit was subsequently re-named the Arab Legion. By the beginning of 1924 the Arab Legion had reached a strength of forty officers and 950 men¹²⁶ in mounted and dismounted units. The Circassians comprised two companies of this force, approximately 30% with at least one Circassian officer, Wasfi Mirza, the son of Mirza Pasha, holding the rank of Captain.¹²⁷ The Circassians still still retained their skill at horse breeding and the mounts

¹²⁴Shwadran, p. 146.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 147.

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 148.

¹²⁷Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.

of the Circassian companies were reputed to be the finest in the Legion.¹²⁸

In 1926 the second High Commission for Palestine, Field Marshal Lord Herbert C. Plumer moved to integrate the military forces at his disposal. Consequently the Arab Legion was reduced from a strength of 1,472 to 855¹²⁹ and given the duties of an urban police force.

The Transjordanian Frontier Force was established and its headquarters moved from Palestine to Zarqa. Initially this force was manned by 17 British officers and an unknown number of Palestinians recruited from the gendarmerie there. This force was not popular, being viewed as an instrument of British control and, although a few Circassians joined, most remained in the Arab Legion.

In 1934 the Arab Legion had reached a strength of forty officers, three cadet officers and 1,002 men.¹³⁰ This figure included the numbers of the Desert Patrol, an all Bedouin unit, organized in 1926 to control tribal affairs. The Legion slowly grew to a strength of 1,642 men in 1938. On 21 March 1939 the Legion commander, F. G. Peake, resigned and was replaced by the commander of the Desert Patrol, Major Glubb.

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹Shwadran, p. 159.

¹³⁰Ibid., 201.

At this time the Circassians continued to hold a disproportionate share of both the officer and enlisted ranks in the Legion. While this is not of particular significance now, the top ranks of the Legion being held by British officers, it would become so with several years when the British were invited to leave.

The major change which transpired in the Legion upon Glubb's assumption to command was the reorganization of the Legion from a basic police unit to a combat unit. On September 16, 1939 Emir Abdullah declared war on Germany and both he and Glubb hoped the Legion would be tested in combat. Although they were used in several small actions the Legion was never able to participate fully in combat and their primary duty was the guarding of storage facilities and roads. The war effort did succeed in raising the authorization for the Legion and it emerged from World War II with a strength of 8,000 men.

During the period 1927-1947 the primary career for the Circassians was agriculture and this period was excellent in that a rapidly developing market in Palestine was available to absorb the agricultural products. Emir Abdullah had launched, early in his administration, a settlement program for the Bedouin tribes which met with limited success. As a part of this program a large number of agricultural experts were brought from England and development programs, to include all agricultural sectors, was begun. Agricultural production, chiefly in wheat,

barley, fruit and livestock rapidly increased.¹³¹ The Palestine market proved to be an economic boon to the Circassians and by the early 1940's they had acquired the reputation as a landed and wealthy class. Several of the families active in politics leased a portion of their landholdings to other less prosperous Circassians. The normal leasing process was that the land holders would provide for all the material needs of the leasee, shelter, food, clothing, etc. and at harvest the leasor received a 75% share of the harvest. This arrangement was the most common and was usually concluded for a period of nine months, after which either party could cancel the lease. In almost all occasions these agreements were concluded within the same Circassian tribe.

The annexation of the West Bank of Palestine had several ramifications for the Circassian community in Jordan. The injection of the highly nationalistic Palestinians into the still parochial Jordanian political scene highlighted the status of the Circassians as a non-Arab group within the state, although conversely this effect benefited several of the Circassian political leaders, Said al-Mufti in particular. One writer characterized the situation as follows:

"Said al-Mufti had a better reputation (among the Palestinians). First, it was assumed that as a Circassian, he would not jeopardize his community by persisting in politics that proved unacceptable to the Palestinians.

¹³¹Castro, E. R. and Dotson, O. W., "Economic Geography of Transjordan," Economic Geography, April 1938, p. 121-130.

Second, he himself dabbled in anti-regime politics in the 1930's and it was felt he was responsive to public opinion. Therefore, in an attempt to appease anti-annexation feeling among the Palestinians in 1950, King Abdullah made Mufti the first post-annexation prime minister, replacing Abu al-Huda, whom the Palestinians held responsible for the much resented Rhodes Armistice Agreement of 1949. In office, Mufti earned the further good will of the Palestinians when he eventually rejected Abdullah's directives to work out a peace treaty with Israel."¹³²

In his appointment as Prime Minister Said al-Mufti had become the first Circassian to be elected to the post. Within the Circassian community this gave Mufti a position of primacy which was to be challenged throughout the next twenty years by Wasfi Mirza. Since, by tradition, only one Circassian was appointed to the Cabinet this rivalry could not be resolved by the appointment of both to cabinet posts and King Abdullah and later King Hussein realized this and skillfully played the two individuals and families against one another.

For purpose of reference and clarity Annex A depicts Circassian representation on the Jordanian Cabinets from 1947 to present day.¹³³

The formation of Israel and the acquisition of the West Bank also had an economic effect on the Circassian

¹³²Bailey, C., "Cabinet Formation in Jordan," The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank, American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977, p. 107.

¹³³"Chronology," Middle East Digest, 1947-1977.

community. Although a large part of the market for agricultural produce was lost following the war with Israel this economic loss was more than compensated for by the rapid rise in land values. Much of the land which the Circassians had been assigned in Amman and the surrounding areas, land which was uncultivable, was now prime residential property.

One author describes the situation in Amman as follows:

"One obvious and immediate consequence of this influx (of Palestinian refugees) was an astronomical rise in rents and land values. A 3-room house, previously let for £50 per annum (\$160.00) could be let for £250 (\$800.00) per annum, with a stipulation of an advance payment of one years rent for vacant possession. A furious construction program was embarked on by contractors, speculators and such refugees as had managed to salvage some of their assets."¹³⁴

In all fairness to the Circassian land owners, several refugee camps were placed on Circassian land and remained, without compensation for several years.¹³⁵ But the total economic effect of the influx was to endow the Circassians with considerable economic gain. This would, in subsequent years, shift the whole cultural emphasis of the next generation of Circassian youth, away from politics and toward the economic sphere. Patai characterizes the Circassians of this time as follows:

¹³⁴Hacker, p. 39.

¹³⁵Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.

"Although the Circassians have become cultivators in Jordan, (as well as Syria where a large number of them were settled), certain characteristics differentiate them from their Arab fellahin neighbors. On their farms they practice weeding, utilize wooden rakes, harrows and scythes, use wagons for transportation, do not employ women in agricultural labor, use stables for their horses and sheds for their cows; many of them specialize as masons, joiners, blacksmiths; their houses are widely spaced, whitewashed and built in a modern style; they wear their own distinctive garb, like to eat meat; practice ceremonial abduction of brides; show no emotions in the case of death (neither men nor women); the eldest son inherits all property; etc.--all customs and practices different from those of their Arab neighbors. Also they lay greater stress on education, and literacy is more frequent among them.

Lately, however, a tendency to assimilate to the Arabs has become noticeable among them, in such matters as language (they had previously spoken their own language) and way of life. Intermarriage with Arabs has begun, although for the time being only between Circassian men and Arab women--as is usual between a socially superior and inferior ethnic groups. At the same time, a tendency toward assimilation to European customs is evident among the Circassians. The younger people, for instance, tend to exchange their old national costume for European style clothing."¹³⁶

Patai is correct in all details of this picture except his comments on intermarriage between Circassians and Arabs.

In almost all cases, Circassian men were required to marry within the family or tribe, while Circassian women, with a well deserved reputation for beauty among the Arabs, were allowed to marry Arab men. The instances of intermarriage were the exception rather than the rule and almost always involved Arab and Circassian families of very high status.¹³⁷

¹³⁶Patai, p. 21.

¹³⁷Weightman, p. 29.

V. THE CIRCASSIANS UNDER KING HUSSEIN

The assassination of King Abdullah on July 20, 1951 initiated a struggle for power between the supporters of Prince Talal, who was at that time in Switzerland undergoing treatment for mental problems, and the supporters of Prince Naif, Talal's brother. Talal was supported by the anti-British, West Bank elements, while Naif had the support of the pro-British, East Bank population. This support was a product more of expectations rather than experience from past performance.

As Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Said al-Mufti became the focus for two major operations. The first was the speedy capture, trial and execution of those responsible for the death of Abdullah, a task which was accomplished, to almost everyone's surprise, within two months. This quick dispatch of justice prevented the episode from becoming a major political topic.

More importantly, Said al-Mufti was regarded as neutral in the contention over the throne and on August 7, 1951 flew to Switzerland to investigate Talal's condition. He returned with the proposal that any decision should be delayed until it could be medically ascertained whether Talal was able to serve as King. Until this was determined Naif would remain as regent. The compromise pleased everyone,

including the British, who had not yet formulated a policy on the succession.

In early September 1951 Dr. Jamil Tutunji, the Minister of Health and Social Affairs returned from Switzerland and proclaimed Talal fit for the duties of King. During this time the pro-Talal forces had gained strength and the British had determined that the assumption Talal would best serve Jordanian and British interests. On September 5, the day after those convicted of plotting Abdullah's assassination were hung, Talal was proclaimed King. Five days later, in a move designed to forestall any further efforts on the Crown by Naif, Amir Hussein was proclaimed Crown Prince.

The struggle between Naif and Talal, or more accurately Talal's supporters, for the Crown continued due in a large part to the recurrent sickness from which Talal suffered. By January 20, 1952 Talal was again ill and sent to Switzerland. He returned in February but departed again in May. By June it was evident that Talal would not be able to dispatch his duties as King. On August 11, 1952 Talal was disposed and Hussein proclaimed King. Prince Naif also lost his position as Regent, after being charged with plotting to take the throne through military action.¹³⁸ In declaring Hussein King and removing Naif as Regent, the Parliament had compromised with both the pro and anti British sectors of the populace and utilized what is

¹³⁸Shwadran, p. 313, n. 10.

known in American politics as the "dark horse candidate".

The move succeeded.

In the crucial times between July 20, 1951 when Abdullah was assassinated and 2 May 1953 when King Hussein assumed duties as King; Said al-Mufti served as both Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. These were critical times for the Hashemite Dynasty. During this period a new constitution had been approved which made the government answerable to the Parliament rather than the King, a move which alleviated much of the criticism by the anti-British elements. Also, a move to unite Jordan with Iraq had been forestalled, a move which could have well placed Jordan under the permanent domination of the branch of the Hashemite family then ruling Iraq. The political role of Said al-Mufti during this period, as well as for several additional years, is best summarized in the following passage,

"Abdullah's aides presided over twelve of the sixteen governments formed between July 1951 and May 1959. Four men (Said al-Mufti, Tawfiq, Abu al-Huda. Samir al-Rafai and Ibrahim Hashim) were exercising power not in their own names but in the name of a dead King, a demented one, and, after August 1952, one who had not yet identified himself. They thrust themselves to the summit of the Jordanian political system not in their own interest, although they manifestly enjoyed the fruits of office, but in the interest, as they understood it, of the dynasty and its external prop."¹³⁹

The Arab Legion and Royal Bodyguard had continued to enjoy Circassian enlistment and a high percentage, when

¹³⁹Hurewitz, J. C., Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1969, p. 317.

measured against other groups by population, were officers. The Legion had distinguished themselves in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. While very few details as to specific Circassian involvement are available it is known that three Circassians, Izzat Hassan, Fauzi Mahir and Mohammad Idris, saw action in the campaign. All three eventually became Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian Army and General Idris is currently serving in that capacity.

The early 1950's also saw the beginnings of the Jordanian Air Force under the supervision of King Hussein, who earned the first Jordanian's pilots wings issued. An early recruit to this branch was Ibrahim Othman who eventually rose to the position of Commander of the Air Force.¹⁴⁰

The two military units which drew the greatest participation from the Circassians were the Royal Bodyguard, enlarged to Brigade size in the early 50's and the Jordanian Commandos formed in 1956.¹⁴¹ While the Royal Bodyguard eventually declined to a strictly ceremonial unit, now possessing only seven members, the Commando unit has become the foremost elite unit in Jordan. It is predominantly Circassian¹⁴² (approximately 75-80%) and was heavily used in the civil strife during 1970.

¹⁴⁰LTC Jamal and Mr. Bak, May 26, 1978.

¹⁴¹Interview with LTC G. Landry, Fort Braff, N.C., 15 May 1977.

¹⁴²Interview with CAPT Ahmad Suweilih, Fort Bragg, N.C., 26 May 1977.

The event which had the largest impact upon Circassians serving in the military was the relief, on 1 March 1956, of General Glubb from command of the Arab Legion. Shortly after Glubb's dismissal the remaining British officers were relieved. Mr. J. C. Hurewitz characterizes the situation as follows:

"The experiment with representative government coincided with the Jordanization of the army officer corps. This meant that at a time when Hussein was agreeing to surrender basic political powers in the cabinet and to the parliament, he was also undermining his capacity to reimpose the traditional full powers of the monarchy, should he feel threatened by the experiment. He had already weakened the armie's officer corps, abandoned a tested mode of financing the entire military establishment and voluntarily extenuated his personal control over that establishment. The withdrawal of the British officers brought to the top command men of doubtful military ability and, from the dynasty's point of view, of doubtful loyalty."¹⁴³

The Circassian officers who were in position to rise in rank upon the departure of the British were an exception to this statement. They had risen to the officer ranks under the British due to their political loyalty and, more importantly, their technical knowledge.

The lack of technical knowledge of ability among East Bank Jordanians in the early post-World War II era had made it necessary to recruit increasing numbers of West Bank Palestinians for the army, especially the officer corps. Emerging from World War II with a strength of 6,000¹⁴⁴ the Arab Legion had expanded to 23,000¹⁴⁵ by 1957,

¹⁴³Hurewitz, p. 320.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 315.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 316.

the Jordanian officer corps going from 300¹⁴⁶ in 1948 to 1,500¹⁴⁷ in 1956.

Following the famous Zarqua Affair on 13 April 1957 the Jordanian officer corps was purged, with 22¹⁴⁸ officers being tried by military courtmartial for attempting to overthrow the King and perhaps as many as 200 additional officers relieved from duty. No Circassian officers were implicated in the plot or relieved from duty as political risks.¹⁴⁹

The new constitution, adopted in 8 January 1952 had brought to the country a new measure of political freedom and a resultant rise in political activity and violence. This did little to effect the Circassian community who elected Said al-Mufti and Wasfi Mirza or Abbas Pasha Mirza to Parliament on a routine basis as they had for almost two decades. Between 3 May 1954 and 30 May 1955 Wasfi Mirza served as the Minister of Agriculture. This cabinet position was of great importance to the Circassians due to their large land holdings and the intense agricultural efforts which were undertaken in Jordan at that time. The Ministry of Agriculture was heavily staffed with Circassians, both then and now, and Wasfi Mirza was to occupy this position of Minister of Agriculture thru times between 1954 and 1961.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 316.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., p. 316.

¹⁴⁸Interview with Mr. Adeeb Shalakho, Patterson, N.J., 22 May 1978.

¹⁴⁹Mr. Adeeb Shalakho, 22 May 1978.

On May 30 1955, Said al-Mufti was called upon by King Hussein to assume the position of Prime Minister to lead the country into the Bagdad Pact. The Pact was intensely disliked within Jordan and Hussein felt that Said al-Mufti, a popular figure with the Palestinians, would be able to convince the cabinet to ratify the Pact. Although he selected for his cabinet, members from the West Bank whom had formerly served as civil servants and therefore usually more tractable, he was unsuccessful and submitted the resignation of his cabinet on November 4th. He was again called upon to serve as Prime Minister on May 22, 1956 in an attempt to stem the intense pressure, by the National Socialist Party, to bring Jordan into the Egyptian government but received a vote of no confidence on June 20, 1956 and was forced to dissolve Parliament. The cabinet of Prime Minister Nabulsi which served from October 29, 1956 to April 10, 1957 and culminated in the Zarqua affair, was with the exception of the Civil War in 1970, the strongest threat encountered by the Hashemite Dynasty. In an attempt to subvert the governmental influence of the Mirza and Mufti families, the Circassian Kurma family, who had become quite weathy as a result of the land speculation boom of 1948, strongly supported the National Socialist Party. While they were unable to become elected or serve in an official government position, they possessed considerable influence throughout the period. When King Hussein clamped down on political activity on April 24, 1957 the Khurma

family lost its political influence and has not been active in government in either an elected or appointed capacity since.

In the wake of the Zarqua affair and the intense political activity by the National Socialist Party, King Hussein faced the basic decision as to whether the country would continue to be subjected to internal political violence and external threat, with the probably outcome the dissolution of the monarchy, or to end all political activity and rule the country through martial law. He chose the latter and on 25 April 1957 he declared martial law. Said al-Mufti was asked to serve in the new cabinet, but for reasons of ill health, was unable to serve, and retired from public life for six years.

Martial law was lifted in November of 1958 and Wasfi Mirza represented the Circassians in the sensitive positions of Minister of Interior and Defense until 1962.

The outcome of the land boom of 1948 was that several Circassian families, most from the Kabardey tribe, rose to great financial prominence. In works on Jordan, when Circassians are mentioned they are normally characterized as land owners or landlords. This wealth, together with the propensity of the wealthy Circassian families to send their youth to college in America or England, gave rise to a new class of Circassians, the technologists and financiers. The four families usually mentioned in connection with land holdings are the Mufti, the Task, the Mirza and the Khurma.

In the economic spheres the Mufti family assisted in the establishment of the Jordanian Central Bank and continue to hold a major portion of shares in the Bank. In this connection Izz al-Din el-Mufti, the younger brother of Said al-Mufti, has held a directorship in the Bank since its' establishment in the early 1960's. He also held the position of Finance Minister in the Cabinet on three occasions between 1962 and 1966. The Mirza family is chiefly represented by four brothers who seemed to have each specialized in a specific area. Said and Izz al-Dinn have already been discussed. The remaining two brothers are Dr. Shawket al-Mufti, a medical doctor and author of Heros and Emperors in Circassian History, represents the family in cultural activities, having held the presidency of the Circassian Charitable Organization on several occasions. He is the acknowledged authority on Circassian history and customs in the country. Little information is available about the fourth brother Raifat.

The Tash family are also involved in banking, holding a directorship on the board of the Jordanian National (Ahli) Bank. The Tash family has never been involved in elective politics but has accepted several appointive positions. The current ambassador to Canada is a member of the Tash family. They are much smaller in number than the Mirza's or Mufti's and while very well respected in the Circassian community, have little political influence.

The Khurma family has already been discussed in regard to their attempt at political influence. This attempt forestalled any further efforts and while very rich in land holdings they have little influence within the Circassian community.

The decade of the 60's saw little major changes for the Circassians in Jordan. This was a period of relative political stability for Jordan and the Circassian community prospered and grew. The lack of any census material which discriminates between ethnic origin reduces any statement of population to an educated guess. The most accurate estimate for 1961 is between 20-25 thousand people.¹⁵⁰ A special enmity appeared to grow between the Circassians, who represented a bloc unquestionably loyal to the monarchy, and the Palestinians, who saw King Hussein as a primary cause for the loss of their homeland. This enmity intensified following the loss of the West Bank in 1967 and Circassian homes became an especially common target for Palestinian "fund gathering activities." The method of one of these was related to me:

"In late 1969 I had just returned from a two year mission in Bahrain, assisting in the establishment of an Infantry School. I joined the Jordanian Commandos in 1960 and became an officer in 1965 after finishing my officers training. One night, several days after I had returned home, the front door was opened, with no warning, we had always left our doors unlocked, and three men entered with machine guns. They were Palestinians and told us they were collecting money for the PLO. This was something strange to me and I didn't know what to do,

¹⁵⁰Weightman, p. 28.

but we gave them some money and told them it was all we had. They knew I was an officer and said I should pay more since I would not fight to get back their homeland, but I told them I didn't have any more money. They left and I asked my family about this and they said that it had already happened twice in the past and the Palestinians took a lot of money from the Adigah because they thought we were all rich. This made me damn mad and when I talked to the other fellows in my unit I found out it was true. After that I was stopped at several road blocks and if they knew I was Circassian they would always demand money. My unit had several meetings with the King (over a period of several months) to tell him about these things and demand we be allowed to take some action but he always was able to persuade us to be patient. King Hussein is a great leader and he felt sympathy for all his people and wanted only peace. We were his soldiers and would obey him in everything he said but finally they pushed even him too far and we got our chance."¹⁵¹

The defeat of the Palestinian units in Jordan ended, or at least rendered negligible the last major threat to the Circassians in Jordan. This victory was not without its casualties however, political as well as physical. Upon the outbreak of fighting in Amman the al-Mufti brothers left the country for an extended stay abroad.¹⁵² The resultant loss of prestige was fatal for the political influence of the Mirza family.

The process of assimilation, which had begun in the early part of the century when Amman lost its totally Circassian character, had developed to a point where a concerted effort had to be made among the Circassian population to preserve the language, customs and traditions.

¹⁵¹CPT Ahmad Suweilih, 26 May 1977.

¹⁵²Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.

One author characterized the situation of the Circassians in 1967 as follows:

Recent decades have witnessed a rapid transformation of this community from a traditional, agrarian, ethnic minority into a modern, urbanized, Arabized, key element in Jordan. Except at occasional dance festivals in Wadi Seir and Jerash, almost no one of either sex under forty ever wears the traditional and distinctive garb of the Adigah. All adult Circassians are bilingual (Circassian and Arabic) among the young educated adults most are trilingual: Circassian, Arab and English. Many are graduates of universities in Lebanon, Egypt, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since the influx of Palestinian refugees have transformed Amman from a sleepy, Circassian village into a turbulent Arab city, many Circassians have completely abandoned the language of their ancestors.

Although a few Circassian intellectuals have embarked upon a campaign to teach a written Circassian language using the Latin alphabet, they have met with no success. The publications of the Circassian Association are all in Arabic. When one Jordanian Circassian writes to another he invariably does so in Arabic--not even in Circassian using the Arabic alphabet. Indeed, although most Circassians are described as bilingual, they tend to be more fluent and more at ease in Arabic than Circassian.

Increasingly, especially in the Amman area, Circassians are distinguishable from the Arabs only by their physical appearance. Even then, the differences are often quite subtle, and the outsider may easily fail to notice the distinction. In general, (and there are always exceptions) the Circassians tend to be stockier and fairer than the Arabs. The Semitic traits often associated with Arabs are lacking in them. While Arabs tend to be dolichocephalic, the Circassians tend to be brachycephalic. In addition, among some of the Adigah and Chechens there appears to have been an intrusion of Tartar racial strains in the past.

Even the minor racial strains are becoming obscured by the growing amount of intermarriage between Circassians and Arabs. Intermarriage between the two groups has of course taken place since the early days of the Circassian settlement. However, in the past it was on limited scale and possessed a peculiar configuration of its own. Contrary to the pattern described by Patai in his The Kingdom of Jordan (p. 21) when intermarriage formerly occurred it was between Circassian women and Arab men--a reversal of the usual situation between a socially superior and a social subordinate ethnic group. This variation on the practice observed in so many other societies is partially explained by the fact that both the Arabs and the Circassians concerned were of high

social status in the Arab community. Invariably, as might be expected in patriarchal societies, these "mixed" offspring while proud of their Circassian legacy, identify themselves with their father's people. In recent years, as the number of intermarriages increase, some Circassian men have taken Arab women as wives. Nevertheless endogamous marriage among Circassians is still the expected, desired, and usual pattern.¹⁵³

The conclusions and analysis of the political status of the present day Circassian population will be presented in the next chapter.

¹⁵³Weightman, p. 27.

VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Circassian minority in Jordan emerged from the civil war of 1970 as a wealthy, influential, and, perhaps most important, loyal and patriotic group. Although the departure from Amman of the leading members of the al-Mufti family did damage the political fortunes of that leading group, the majority of the Circassians had been actively involved with the struggle firmly on the side of the Hashemite Dynasty. The return of stability after the civil war marked a return to security for both Hussein and the Circassians.

As mentioned earlier, the pattern of Circassian involvement in the government had been undergoing a shift throughout the previous decade. The phenomenon of a Circassian cabinet minister in almost every cabinet began to disappear in the late 1960's and since April 19, 1970 only one Circassian has served in the Cabinet, and he served in the position of Minister of Agriculture, a far less powerful post than the traditional Interior or Vice Premier. Late in 1974 Said al-Mufti had retired from his position as Head of the House of Notables, a largely ceremonial position, drawing to an end an era of political domination by the al-Mufti family.

The new trend, reflecting either the ineffectiveness of the political system or the new technological emphasis depending upon one's point of view, is away from Parliamentary (i.e., elective) positions and toward appointive positions.¹⁵⁴

The economic events of 1974-1976 saw a land boom in Amman and Wadi Seir of unprecedented proportions. Following the outbreak of active hostilities in Beirut, foreign business flocked to Amman. One source characterized the period as follows:

"After things began to get difficult in Lebanon, many of the foreign businesses in Beirut, that was the center for international trade in the whole region, needed a new place with security. Amman had recovered from the difficulties by that time and the government was quite hopeful of getting these businesses to move to Jordan. Some new laws were passed to make things easier for these companies to come and soon land prices really went up around Amman and Wadi Seir. The expansion of Amman went to the west, because of the good roads, toward the other Circassian towns. Most of the Circassian land was either sold or leased. Prices were as high as 150,000 J.D. (\$420,000) to 200,000 J.D. (\$560,000) per dunham and getting higher. All this land speculation stopped in 1976 when the government threatened to pass high taxes to stop the land speculation. Many of the Circassians, much more than before, are getting involved in trade now from the money they got from the lands. Many have taken jobs with the foreign firms which moved in, representing the firms with the Jordanian government. Politics is not so popular anymore and is viewed as a traditional thing now. In the last elections, in 1976, Rifat Mirza, brother of Wasfi Mirza, was going to run for a seat but no one in the Circassian community was interested and he could get no support."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

The military is another area in which Circassian participation has declined in favor of appointive political positions and trade. While no figures are available and Circassian enlistment in the elite Commando unit and Air Force continue to be high, Circassian enlistment in troop units has declined.¹⁵⁶

As stated in the introduction to this thesis, the framework for the analysis of the position or status of the Circassians in Jordan is that originally put forth by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture. For obvious reasons this analysis will not be either as detailed or as systematic as that which they set forth due to the lack of on-site research. However, as Dr. Ben-Dor points out this should not be a prerequisite for using the framework, simply as acknowledged deficiency. The only study on Jordan which approached the survey techniques propounded by Almond and Verba was the chapter on Jordan from Daniel Lerner's book, The Passing of Traditional Society,¹⁵⁷ This study is now quite dated and was not conducted in any depth.¹⁵⁸ and the work was concluded five years previous to The Civic Culture.

¹⁵⁶Mr. Bak and LTC Jamal, 26 May 1978.

¹⁵⁷Lerner, D., The Passing of Traditional Society, The Free Press, 1958.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., p. 315.

The Civic Culture attempts to explain the relationship of a people to a government and vice versa using, as its measurement, the progress toward a democracy or participatory government, a country has made. In this standard it suffers from a western orientation, but acknowledges this¹⁵⁹ and attempts to compensate for it by including five nations, the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Mexico in the study.¹⁶⁰

The chief strength of the theory of the Civic Culture lies not in its goal--to evaluate a country based on its progress toward democracy or "the civic culture",¹⁶¹ but in its system of analysis of populations and population subcultures. This system utilizes several terms which must be defined before proceeding further.

The basic term used in this method of analysis is "political culture" defined as "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of self in the system."¹⁶² In discussing these attitudes three categories are utilized "cognitive orientation," that is knowledge of and belief about the political system",¹⁶³ "affective orientation or feelings

¹⁵⁹Almond and Verba, p. 40.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁶¹Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁶²Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 14.

about the political system, its roles, personnel and performance,"¹⁶⁴ and "evaluational orientation, the judgments and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings."¹⁶⁵

These categories of attitudes are measured against four criteria, 1. the system as a general object or general knowledge about the system, 2. input objects or, the conversion of demands by the citizen into policy, 3. output objects or the administration of policy and finally 4. the self as an object or degree to which the individual feels he possesses the ability to influence the system.¹⁶⁶

Based upon these the measurement of these criteria the political culture of a nation, or subculture within a nation¹⁶⁷ is divided into a mixture of one of three basic types, "parochial, subject or participant." The three most prevalent culture mixtures are the "parochial-subject culture" in which, "a substantial portion of the population has rejected the exclusive claims of diffuse tribal, village or federal authority and has developed allegiance toward a more complex political system with specialized central

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁶⁷Ibid., p. 26.

governmental structures."¹⁶⁸ The main factor which differs this type of culture from the two following is the lack of opportunity for the individual to become involved in the governmental decision process.

The "subject-participant" culture is the second major political culture evident in the world today. It is defined as a culture in which, "a substantial part of the population has acquired specialized input orientations and an activist set of self-orientations, while most of the remainder of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of self-orientation."¹⁶⁹ The two primary features of this type of culture are, "a characteristic pattern of structural instability with an alternation of authoritarian and democratic governments,"¹⁷⁰ which produces a political culture which, "accepts the norms of a participant culture, but their sense of competence is not based on experience or on a confident sense of legitimacy."¹⁷¹

The third political culture cited is the, "parochial-participant" culture which is, "evident in most emerging nations."¹⁷² In this type we have, "no structure on either

¹⁶⁸Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁷⁰Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁷¹Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁷²Ibid., p. 26.

side to lean on, neither a bureaucracy resting upon loyal subjects, nor an infrastructure arising from responsible and competent citizens."¹⁷³

A final point must be made about the utilization of this theoretical framework in the analysis of the Circassian minority in Jordan. The political culture of a given nation, or any subculture within that culture, will have various combinations and strains of the three major types of political culture. In terms of the Circassian minority in Jordan a single tribe or family may have a political outlook or orientation far removed from the majority. The major thrust of this section is to determine and analyze the major or dominant political outlook. For example, in Daniel Lerner's chapter on Jordan he identifies four distinct cultural groups.¹⁷⁴

Many minority groups within a culture tend to identify themselves in an ethnic rather than national context. The phenomenon is perhaps most evident in the Middle East in the case of the Palestinians, aided in no small part by the efforts of their host countries to keep them isolated from the citizenry of the country. Do the Circassians of Jordan see themselves in a larger cultural context? Prior to an analysis of the Jordanian Circassians as a political subculture of Jordan, it is necessary to insure that they conceive of themselves as part of the citizenry of Jordan

¹⁷³Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁷⁴Lerner, p. 315.

and not a greater ethnic body. The primary measure of this would be the interaction between Circassian communities in Syria, which contain the largest Circassian population in the Middle East. In all interviews conducted with Circassians from both Jordan and Syria, the Participants stated that the only interaction between the two communities was for the purpose of Circassian men finding a Circassian woman to marry, and with the advent of increased intermarriage with the Arabs, this interaction has declined greatly. The most frequently stated reason for this lack of interaction was the persistent political instability between the two countries. When questioned about political loyalty all Jordanian Circassians, even those whom had left the country to become American citizens, stated that the Syrian and Jordanian Circassians had so little in common that there was little reason for interaction between the two communities.¹⁷⁵

Similarly a desire to return to the Caucasus can be dispensed with as a factor not impinging upon the primary outlook of the Circassians to the Jordanian government. Opportunities to return to the Circassian homeland have been, and continue to be available to Jordanian Circassians. But other than for purposes of study, as previously mentioned, few if any Circassians desire to return, at least until the area has been "liberated" from the Russians, a fond hope which many Circassians voice, but towards which little

¹⁷⁵Interviews cited.

activity is taken. When asked about such an eventuality most Circassians voice sentiments which are reminiscent of the pioneer American, the carving out of a homeland in a hostile and barren area and a feeling of participation in the establishment of Jordan.

From these attitudes it is fairly safe to assume that the Circassian minority in Jordan conceives of its central loyalty as being to the larger, supre-national, ethnic Circassian race.

Following the civic culture system (and again, as previously stated, drawing from a limited sampling and historical reference), the analysis of the political orientation of the Jordanian Circassian will proceed along the lines illustrated by the following diagram:¹⁷⁶

Dimensions of Political Orientation

1. System as general object	2. Input objects	3. Output objects	4. Self as active participant
Cognition			
Affect			
Evaluation			

The cognitive orientation of the Jordanian Circassians is perhaps the most easy to generalize since this rests primarily on an educational, rather than emotional basis. Thus, the "knowledge of and belief about the political

¹⁷⁶Almond and Verba, p. 15.

system"¹⁷⁷ can be said to be a function of the Jordanian educational system rather than information received from other sources, unless that information runs contrary to the information from the educational system. In this context, most alternate information sources, Palestinian publications, foreign news sources etc. which have been hostile to the Jordanian political system have also been hostile to the Circassians, picturing them as loyal supporters of that system. This would leave only the home and family as a source of information contrary to the educational system, which, considering the rigid discipline reknown in Circassian households, is a remote possibility. The affective orientation of the system as a whole, the "feelings about the system" would appear to proceed from and be reenforced by the cognitive orientation. While it is true that Circassians have been active in alternative political movements,¹⁷⁸ this activity has been largely viewed as either aberation from the "norm"¹⁷⁹ or as an attempt by a family to subvert the political power of a family in power, such as the support, in 1956, by the Tash family of al-Nabulsi. In this category, background and culture dictates loyalty to the system. The evaluational orientation of the Jordanian

¹⁷⁷Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁷⁸Weightman, p. 28.

¹⁷⁹Mr. Bak, 25 May 1978.

political system is most frequently evident in comparisons, which Jordanian Circassians have made between the American and Jordanian political systems. The "judgements and opinions" which emerge usually revolve around the necessity for Jordan, in a constant state of danger from the exterior and a need to rapidly modernize in the interior, to have a strong central government. This sentiment is usually combined with a favorable opinion of King Hussein. The key to King Hussein's success in Jordan has been linked with the ability by Hussein to command deep personal loyalty on the part of various sectors of his country. This sense of personal loyalty is very much evident in the Circassians. The combination which emerges is the necessity of a strong central government due to interior and exterior factors and the conviction that the power of such a government will not be abused in the hands of King Hussein. This feeling also extends to Crown Prince Hassan, who has been very active in commercial activities and has close contact with several leading Circassian families. This general conception of personal loyalty is strengthened by the recent marriage of the son of Wasfi Mirza to King Hussein's daughter, Alyia.

The political orientations of the Jordanian Circassians toward the input objects of the Jordanian political system, the conversion of Circassian political needs into policy would also seem to follow the above pattern. The Circassians have, throughout the political history of Jordan, been

well represented by the Circassian elite in the system. While the representation within the Circassian community has been controlled by an elite, is conceived of as a representation of the whole community and not of that elite. The cognitive orientation of the Circassian minority has been fairly well channeled, in earlier periods of Jordanian history toward the traditional elite of the tribe, and in the latter years toward positions requiring technological ability. The effective orientation toward input objects has been one of a pride based upon success, both political and economic. The evaluational orientation of input objects would tend to follow the above orientations, although may be effected by the judgement as to the relative effectiveness of the Circassian elite to represent a particular family or tribe based upon intra-family or tribal conflicts. Information on these conflicts is almost impossible to get due to a desire on the part of Circassians to de-emphasize such conflicts to non-Circassians.

The political orientations of Circassians as to the output objects or administration of programs and policies revolves, around two major areas. The first is the strong identification of Jordanian Circassians with the governmental instruments which administrate governmental decisions. The high percentage of Circassians in the military and other governmental branches, since the formation of the Emirate has created this concept.

The second major area dealing with governmental output objects is the frustration, among the younger generation, of attempting to make the radical transition necessary to allow Jordan to realize many of its economic and social goals. This frustration is normally not directed toward governmental bureaus but rather at the traditional elements of society opposed to change. The events of the early 1970's, the civil war and later the influx of foreign firms from Beirut has done much to ameliorate such discontent, due to the prompt and successful government action in both cases.

Thus the cognitive orientation of the Circassians toward the output objects of the government is one of experience and tradition. This re-enforces the affective orientation as the Circassian minority identifies with the output objects, and finally the evaluational orientation, based on the above is one of relative approval, although marred by the inability of the output objects to overcome certain traditional areas of resistance.

The crux of the civic culture is the concept of self. The concept is of such importance as to necessitate the full definition from the text. The concept of self as active participant entails the following:

"How does he perceive of himself as a member of his political system? What knowledge does he have of his rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies of access to influence? How does he feel about his capabilities? What norms of participation or of performance does he acknowledge and employ in formulating political judgements, or in arriving at opinions?"¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰Almond and Verba, p. 16.

This is the most difficult category in which to draw generalizations since it deals with personal feelings which most Circassians have been reluctant to discuss. However, the history of the Circassians in Jordan allow certain conclusions to be made. Governmental service has been a tradition in this history and this has formed, to some extent the norms of participation. The strong opposition to the regime by the Palestinians, which included opposition to the Circassian minority in particular, has also re-enforced this sense of duty and the large number of successful Circassians in the government, military and economics has provided a role model for norms of performance, and possibilities of success. While such role models have been members of an elite to which entry is based upon family status is undeniable, but in areas such as the military this has been the exception rather than the rule.

Based upon the political orientation outlined above the Circassian political subculture would be categorized as being strongly participatory in nature with some lingering traces of subject culture attitudes. The Circassian minority in Jordan has escaped the fate of the Circassians in Syria, that is alientation by both the government and populace due to allegiance to an authoritarian government which was overthrown. Undoubtedly this lesson was not lost on them and the reaction was one of strong participation in the Jordanian government stemming from both self interest and a cultural background which

reenforces this attitude. The Circassian minority can be expected to continue in its support for the monarchy which has reciprocated its support with political, economic and military opportunities. Although the younger generation of Circassians may become increasingly discontented by the progress which the government is able to make in certain economic spheres, they are unlikely to become agents of radical change, due in part to their cultural background and in part to the large vested interest they have in the system. The amazement which many authors on Jordan have voiced over the political survival of King Hussein is due in no small part to the ignorance of factors, such as the Circassian minority, at work. Although the possibilities for a violent overthrow in the area are always present the possibility of an orderly transition of power, should King Hussein die, are far more likely. This transition will be made far more smooth by the support of the Circassian minority, among many other sectors of the Jordanian populace, have for Crown Prince Hassan.

The Circassian minority in Jordan will continue to support the Hashemite monarchy and provide a conservative sector of the populace deeply involved in the economic modernization of the country.

APPENDIX A

Circassian Representation on Jordanian Cabinets

<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Circassian Representative</u>	<u>Cabinet Post</u>
February 6, 1947	Abbas Pasha Mirza	Interior
May 7, 1947	Said al Mufti	Interior
April 13, 1950	Said al Mufti	Prime Minister
October 14, 1950	Said al Mufti	Prime Minister
December 4, 1950	Abbas Pasha Mirza	Interior
July 25, 1951	Said al Mufti	Vice Prime Minister Interior
September 7, 1951	Said al Mufti	Vice Prime Minister Interior
September 30, 1952	Said al Mufti	Vice Prime Minister Interior
May 6, 1953	Said al Mufti	Deputy Prime Minister Minister of State
May 3, 1954	Wasfi Mirza	Agriculture
October 21, 1954	Wasfi Mirza	Agriculture
May 30, 1955	Said al Mufti	Prime Minister
December 15, 1955	Abbas Pasha Mirza	Interior
December 21, 1955	None	
January 9, 1956	None	
May 22, 1956	Said al Mufti	Prime Minister
July 1, 1956	None	
October 29, 1956	None	

<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Circassian Representative</u>	<u>Cabinet Post</u>
April 15, 1957	Said al Mufti	Deputy Prime Minister Interior Agriculture
April 25, 1957	None	
May 18, 1958	None	
May 5, 1959	Wasfi Mirza	Interior
August 29, 1960	Wasfi Mirza	Agriculture Social Affairs
June 28, 1961	Wasfi Mirza	Defense Public Works
January 27, 1962	Izz al-Din al Mufti	Finance
December 2, 1962	Izz al-Din al Mufti	Finance Customs
March 27, 1963	Said al Mufti	Vice Prime Minister
April 21, 1963	None	
July 10, 1963	Said al Mufti	Vice Prime Minister
July 7, 1964	None	
February 13, 1965	Izz al-Din al Mufti	Finance
December 22, 1966	Wasfi Mirza	Interior
March 4, 1967	Wasfi Mirza	Interior
April 23, 1967	None	
August 2, 1967	Izz al-Din al Mufti	Communications
October 7, 1967	None	
March 24, 1969	None	
August 12, 1969	None	
April 19, 1970	None	
June 27, 1970	None	

<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Circassian Representative</u>	<u>Cabinet Post</u>
September 16, 1970	None	
September 26, 1970	None	
October 28, 1970	Umar Abdullah	Agriculture
May 22, 1971	Umar Abdullah	Agriculture
November 29, 1971	Umar Abdullah	Agriculture
August 21, 1972	Umar Abdullah	Agriculture
May 26, 973	Umar Abdullah	Agriculture
November 23, 1974	Umar Abdullah	Agriculture
February 8, 1976	Umar Abdullah	Agriculture
July 13, 1976	Umar Abdullah	Agriculture
November 28, 1976	Umar Abdullah	Agriculture

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
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